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Article
The Relational Rights of Children
PAMELA LAUFER-UKELES
Although children have been considered central to family law for some time, the
discussion of children's rights is still controversial and the methodology for advocating on
behalf of children contested Modern accounts of how to best uphold the interests of
children are based on one of three models. Parents are either designated the fiduciaries
best positioned to protect the interests of children, or the state is deemed responsible for
intervening to protect the rights of children, or theorists and lawmakers look to decipher
children's own voices and perspectives in order to develop child-centered advocacy. These
three perspectives often stand in opposition to each other and result in children's rights
being articulated in the midst of struggle and dissonance. The best interests standard most
often relied upon to protect children's interests is amorphous and subject to internal
conflict and manipulation. Moreover, it is based on competing interests and factors and
subject to differing perspectives based on the three models for how to best protect children.
In this Article, I argue that none of the three models do enough to advance children's
advocacy. Instead I argue for a children's rights perspective that focuses on what children
need most-relationships. Leaning on empirical and psychological studies, I argue that
these relationships bring children to maturity, provide them with the care upon which they
depend, and provide the context through which their rights should be viewed In order to
keep relationships central to the legal treatment of children, I advocate for the theoretical
shiftfrom an individualist account of rights to a relational account of rights and interests of
children. In advancing this relational approach, I propose three guiding principles to
reshape family law in a manner that focuses on supporting children's relationships. First, I
argue that while family law currently serves children only upon the breakdown of care
relationships, in reality, relationships need ongoing support much earlier. Social welfare
programs as well as emotional, educational, and financial support should be directed at
supporting relationships, particularly at-risk relationships, to prevent crises. Second, I
describe how children have a variety of relationships upon which they depend A variety of
significant relationships should be recognized to coexist alongside each other in a
differentiated manner that considers the relative harm and benefits from relationships and
their disruption. Third, I argue that effectuating children's civil rights and the propriety of
state interference with parental discretion needs to be examined within the context of
ongoing relationships. When state interference with parents to protect the rights of children
harms significant care relationships, the state must tread cautiously. However, when
significant care relationships are not threatened, the civil rights of individual children can
be more readily realized
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The Relational Rights of Children
PAMELA LAUFER-UKELES*
1. INTRODUCTION
Children, still a voiceless minority, are often tucked away as being
dependent and only remembered by the law when things go very wrong
and they need to be saved or punished. The rights and interests of
children,i whether based on case law, statutory law, or international human
rights principles,2 have become decidedly more important in recent
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan
University Faculty of Law (2014-2016). The author would like to thank Jennifer Nedelsky, Martha
Fineman, Laura Kessler, Mary Anne Case, Nancy Dowd, Susan Appleton, Linda McClain, Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat, Ruth Zafran, Yuval Feldman, Rona Schuz, Michael Baris, Michal Alberstein, and
Benjamin Shmueli for helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.
'See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1867-
68 (1987) (listing some fundamental children's rights). Although "rights talk" is often criticized as
creating unnecessary tension, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1841 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg] ("Rights talk, when repeated often enough in connection with the power of parents
over children, has the potential to undermine a generist perspective on adult authority."), most believe
it is necessary to counteract strong notions of parental rights by arguing that children deserve the same
level of protection, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother? ": Conceptualizing
Children's Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107, 109 (1995)
[hereinafter Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?"] ("[I]n a rights-oriented legal culture, children need
more than the weak reed of a claim to 'interests' if they are to make their needs and voices heard.").
Using the term rights, as opposed to interests, is often viewed as a strategic choice rather than a factual
distinction. See, e.g., JAMES G. DwYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 12 (2006)
[hereinafter DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS] ("Let me emphasize . . . that I am deploying an
understanding of rights, consistent with common usage, whereby rights can be protections of persons'
interests independently of any choices they make."); Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between
Children's Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEv. L.J. 141, 152 (2004) (explaining that the phrase "'children's
rights' is used extraordinarily loosely and broadly"); Minow, supra, at 1886-87 (attempting to define
rights). But see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166 (1986) (providing a firm definition of
rights); Alon Harel, Theories of Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 191, 192-93 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (analyzing a
logical framework for defining rights); Alon Harel, Whose Home Is It? Reflections on the Palestinians'
Interest in Return, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 339-40 (2004) (reasoning that "not each and
every right derived from . . . [a] general right is conducive to the interests of the rightholders"). For our
purposes I use the terms interchangeably, relying most on rights as they are stronger and more
influential in modern discourse.
2 See Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 Hous.
L. REv. 703, 708 (2009) ("A legal regime governs dependency in all aspects of children's lives and
agency, essentially assigning to their parents or other adult caregivers the power and authority to
represent children's needs . . . ."); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can't or Won't
Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIz. L. REv. 381, 382-83 (2011)
(detailing the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) standards for lawyers advocating
decades. Children, however, still do not receive sufficient attention by
legislatures, courts, or in legal academia. Although children's issues are
implicated in a variety of legal arenas, such as criminal law and
constitutional law, they are primarily viewed as part and parcel of family
law, having been deemed not necessarily worthy of their own accounting.'
Discussing children's rights at all is controversial because such rights are
seen as opposing parental rights and the methods for protecting children
advocated by jurists and scholars are highly disputed.
In this Article, I tackle the compelling reasons why children's rights
and interests are often minimized and, when recognized, highly disputed. I
devise core principles of a new legal framework for family law that seeks
to resolve some of this tension and lack of recognition, based on a system
of relational rights as opposed to individualistic rights. I argue that legal
rules intended to protect children should not merely rely on amorphous
determinations of what is "best" for a given individual child or what
individual rights such a child possesses. Rather, the state should be more
proactive in supporting children within their ongoing and varied
relationships in a manner that is reflective of their ongoing needs and
developing maturity.7 The relational perspective that I develop does not
abandon children to the privacy and discretion of parental relationships,
but it also does not pretend that children are isolated individuals reliant on
the state's protection of their rights and privacy interests. Instead, the
relational perspective looks to the state to support children's ongoing care
relationships, usually with parents.
on behalf of children); Daniel W. Shuman, Troxel v. Granville and the Boundaries of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 41 FAM. CT. REv. 67, 68 (2003) ("[Tihe focus on the best interest of the child standard
has prioritized the interests of the child and sought the insights of mental health professionals to assess
these interests."); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 315 (1998) (tracing the
development of children's rights in the United States). For international conventions, see the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989),
www.un.org/documents/galres/44/a44r025.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC73-UET8] [hereinafter CRC].
See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 2, at 382-86, 410-15 (discussing the ways in which child-centered
advocacy has become more central in recent decades).
4 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825, 849-54 (2004)
(reviewing various ways children are still treated unfairly by the legal system).
'See Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 526-28 (2014) ("[A]
welter of different laws, from different sources, governs children and childhood . . . .").
6 For instance, the U.S. refused to ratify the CRC and generally prefers a parental privacy
perspective on children's interests that keeps children's needs private. See Martha Albertson Fineman,
What Is Right for Children?, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?: THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1-4 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington eds., 2009)
[hereinafter COMPETING PARADIGMS] (forming "an explanatory framework for considering the failure
of the US to ratify the ... CRC").
' For a thorough discussion of the legal relevance of children's increasing maturity, see Jonathan
Todres, Maturity, 48 HOus. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2012).
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There are essentially three competing models for how best to pursue
children's advocacy in the legal context: parent-centered, state-centered,
and child-centered. While each of these models may allow for other
interests or strategies to advance children's needs, the primary focus is
either on parental care, state intervention, or children's autonomy. The
parent-centered model is based on a fundamental belief that parents should
be given leeway to act on behalf of children, either because they are best
situated to determine what is best for their own children, or because of the
value in promoting diversity in child upbringing.9 The state-centered model
is similar to the state's role in preserving and protecting the rights of adults,
while also protecting the state's own interests in children.' 0 The child-
centered model looks to children themselves, particularly their desires,
capabilities, lived experiences, and needs, to determine what should be
done in a manner that focuses on children's actual will and autonomy-or
our potential to decipher and support that autonomy through progressive
and creative means." Advocates of each of the three perspectives intend to
protect children and claim to carry the mantle of children's rights. Yet, the
differences between the perspectives are significant, and opposing
positions are hotly debated.
This tension translates into confusion and inconsistency in discussions
of children's rights. While the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child is a document that includes elements of all three visions, the
' See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions."); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children s
Rights, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 355, 391 [hereinafter Buss, Constitutional Fidelity] ("[P]arents ... [have]
authority to exercise control over children for their own good."); Emily Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88
VA. L. REv. 635, 647-50 (2002) [hereinafter Buss, "Parental" Rights] ("Parents' strong emotional
attachment to their children and considerable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the
child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue their children's best interests in most
circumstances.").
9See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights,
9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 19 (1986) (discussing how diversity of upbringing promotes children's
interests).
0 DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 17-23 (describing children's rights to have the
state protect their interests); see also James G Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination and Childrent
Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring ofChildren's Family Life, 54 ARiZ. L. REV.
79, 120-24 (2012) [hereinafter Dwyer, Parents'Self-Determination] (providing arguments in favor of
state intervention to protect children's interests).
" See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family,
1993 BYU L. REv. 497, 501-04 [hereinafter Woodhouse, Destruction and Promise] (reviewing new
developments in American family courts); Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1827-44
(suggesting different ways the law can utilize a child-centered perspective); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Out ofChildren's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's Voice in Defining the Family,
8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 323 (1994) [hereinafter Woodhouse, The Child's Voice] ("By incorporating
children's perspectives and stories in our deliberations, we can move children's rights towards a
discourse that neither assumes a premature autonomy nor denies children the respect necessary for their
growth toward autonomy.").
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accord has been variously criticized for being too state-centered, child-
centered, or parent-centered.12 Moreover, legal theorists often associate the
use of "children's rights" language as referring to a child- or state-centered
(as opposed to a parent-centered) vision because rights are generally
associated with individualistic autonomy, 3 specifically autonomy from
parents. However, because children cannot always articulate their own
liberty interests and their immaturity compromises their ability to
autonomously achieve their vision, individualistic rights can be a difficult
fit for children.1 4 Others have argued that a right need not be protected by a
child's own agency. Rather, the state can protect children's rights, and
parents and other adults can respect and further those rights, even if
children are not fully autonomous agents." Thus, the term "rights" need
not necessitate reliance on full autonomy or "children's rights" refer to a
state- or child-centered vision of children's advocacy.
Similarly, those that rely on "best interests" analyses emphasize the
need for third parties, usually parents, to be anointed as stewards to make
decisions that are best for children. Such analyses are often thought to
reflect a more paternalistic, parental rights-friendly position in contrast to a
children's rights perspective that emphasizes children's autonomy." The
child's best interests standard, however, must also take into account all of
children's varied interests that are in need of protection, including
2 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Kathryn A. Johnson, The United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Empowering Parents to Protect Their Children's Rights, in COMPETING
PARADIGMS, supra note 6, at 7, 8-9 (arguing that the CRC incorporates parental rights and best
interests in a manner that makes it unthreatening to parental rights advocates); Shulamit Almog & Ariel
L. Bender, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Meets the American Constitution: Towards a
Supreme Law of the World, II INT'L J. CILD. RTs. 273, 277 (2003) (arguing that the CRC grants
rights to children that frequently conflict with both parental rights and judicial discretion, focusing on
the rights of the child detached from parent or state).
" See Almog & Bender, supra note 12, at 278 (describing the autonomous nature of rights).
4 See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 BYU L. REv. 605, 647 ("The presumptions arising
from the limited capacities of minors account in large part for the general limitation on their exercise of
rights .... ); Anne C. Dailey, Children's Transitional Rights, LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 1, 4 (2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfim~abstractid=2392570 [https://perma.cclRKJ2-BFHH]
("Because they are presumed to lack adult autonomous decision-making skills, children are not treated
as full citizens entitled to lead lives of their own choosing.").
" See Minow, supra note 1, at 1885 ("Autonomy, then, is not a precondition for any individual's
exercise of rights. The only precondition is that the community is willing to ... make claims and ...
participate in the shifting of boundaries."); see also Dailey, supra note 14, at 5 (stressing the
importance of "children's rights rooted not in autonomy, but in their distinct place and future in the
liberal polity").
6 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); Leonard 1. Rotman, Fiduciary Law's
"Holy Grail": Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 942
(2011) (defining a fiduciary's duties); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81
VA. L. REV. 2401, 2402 (1995) ("[Tlhe parental relationship, once established, has intrinsic value for
the child that extends beyond successful performance of caretaking tasks.").
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children's civil rights, and children's own expressed desires.,7 In fact, in
practice, the best interests standard is not frequently used to interfere and
supplant parental privacy in favor of state interests and in furtherance of
majoritarian values.' 8 The best interests standard should take into account
all categories of children's rights and interests, and numerous factors,
which are potentially conflicting and incongruous, somehow arriving at a
determinative position as to what is "best" for children. 19 In easy cases this
analysis may not be difficult. When contentious issues arise, however, such
as relocations, parental terminations, issues regarding the custody of
children born to undocumented immigrants, and issues regarding
incarcerated parents, which potentially create a conflict between children's
interests in attachments with parents and state visions of normative family
life, resolutions are nebulous. Thus, catch phrases such as "children's
rights" and "best interests" provide little guidance or overall vision of how
to specifically pursue children's advocacy in difficult cases where parent-
centered, state-centered, and child-centered visions for children's advocacy
clash.
Even if a blend of such visions is ultimately necessary, having access
to a guiding principle underlying the implementation of children's rights is
sorely lacking given the tension between these three models. 20 As I will
demonstrate in this Article, competing perspectives result in significantly
different legal implications on child-related issues such as custody, parental
termination proceedings, and children's civil rights. 21 Indeed, instead of
building on the merits of each perspective, the discussion surrounding
"See, e.g., Appell, supra note 1, at 153 (discussing different categories of children's rights,
including children's civil rights, privacy rights, and dependency rights); Ariel Ayanna, From
Children's Interests to Parental Responsibility: Degendering Parenthood Through Custodial
Obligation, 19 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 1, 12-13 (2012) (listing the variety of factors of parental
adequacy used in balancing tests performed in the legal sphere with regards to child custody); Minow,
supra note 9, at 14-21, 24 (discussing different categories of children's rights).
" Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Case Against Separating the Care from the Caregiver: Reuniting
Caregivers' Rights and Children's Rights, 15 NEv. L.J. 236, 259 (2014).
1 See sources cited supra note 17; see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 954-58 (1979) (discussing the
uncertainty created by the best interests standard and the problematic nature of bargaining in the
"shadow" of such uncertainty); Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child
Custody, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 54, 71-72 (2002) (discussing criticism of the best interest standard
in that it gives judges too much discretion and injects uncertainty into out-of-court negotiations);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of
the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 69, 74 (2014) (summarizing the difficulties
courts face when trying to determine what is in a child's best interest).
20 See Appleton, supra note 5, at 526 ("The ordinary word 'child' denotes an extraordinary legal
category, which in turn makes childhood an exceptional legal status. Yet, the contours, content, and
consequences of this category all reflect disarray.").
21 See infa PartllB.
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children's rights is fraught with dispute and inconsistency. 22 Advocates of
state involvement focus on the need to curtail parental rights; parental
rights advocates look to prevent state interference; and children-centered
advocates try to keep both parents and the state at bay, searching for new
and creative ways to encourage and decipher children's own voices. This
triad of perspectives has largely played out as a power grab among
competing concerns. Despite the promise of a child-centered approach and
the progressive use of narrative, child-centered inquiries require creativity
and sensitivity in a manner that is difficult and costly for judicial systems. 23
Reverting to rules, rights, and presumptions is the norm. As between a
parental rights perspective and a state rights perspective, context matters,
as does the nature of the claim, and choosing one perspective over the
other as the dominant legal mantra appears to be a futile undertaking. We
are essentially stuck between these two procedural mechanisms-that is,
between the power of parental rights and preferences, which continue to
dominate family law, and the alternative argument in favor of state
interference. 24 Children's interests demand more than the dissonant
crossfire between competing concerns.
Ultimately, children's rights cannot be completely subsumed to
parental rights--children have needs that may conflict with parental needs
and these rights should be taken seriously. Further, children's rights cannot
be subsumed to state control either, as it is usually parents who need to
provide care. Although children cannot be entirely relied upon to effectuate
their own needs, since they are caught between agency and dependency, 25
the stronger voices they develop as they mature and the transitional nature
of childhood must be taken into account. In this Article, I will attempt to
break this polarized and atomistic account of children's advocacy and
present reasoned guiding legal principles that can ease the tension by
moving from an individualistic to a relational account of children's rights.
The accepted position in case law and scholarship is that children's
interests are a separate, individualistic inquiry, and that they regularly
22 See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REv. 637, 638 (2006)
(stating that "the debate between advocates of parents' rights and children's rights is charged and
polarized").
' See, e.g., Harry Brighouse, How Should Children Be Heard?, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 691, 707-08
(2003) (arguing that children's voices should be treated as "consultative rather than authoritative");
William A. Kell, Voices Lost and Found: Training Ethical Lawyers for Children, 73 IND. L.J. 635,
651-57 (1998) (explaining that attorneys have to be different advocates, investigators, and interpreters
under a child-centered approach).
24 See Appleton, supra note 5, at 540 (discussing the tension between parental rights and state
authority); Huntington, supra note 22, at 643 (suggesting that parents' rights are a long-standing legal
principle that "has driven federal and state legislation and shaped legal doctrine"); Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1811.
25 See Appleton, supra note 5, at 549 (noting the tension between children's agency and their
dependency).
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compete and conflict with parental rights and state interests.26 Children's
lives, however, are not individualistic, but rather relationship-based, and
sociological and psychological studies support the centrality of
relationships to children's well-being and development. 2 7 The child is in an
inseparable interdependent relationship with their custodians and the
relational nature of children's lives cannot be ignored.2 8 Children's rights
should not be primarily viewed as individualistic rights for the state to
protect or liberty rights to be free from state interference, but as rights to
have the state support the relationships children need in order to grow and
develop into adults. 29 Children's rights discussions should focus on
supporting these interdependent relationships between children and
caregivers as opposed to amorphous individualistic best interests analyses.
Such relational support should also reflect the transitional maturity of
children and their changing reliance on relationships. The state should not
be viewed as a threat to children's right to privacy, but rather as a necessary
partner in helping parents nurture children's development so that they can
effectuate their own autonomy and capacities. 3 0 I will demonstrate how
relational rights capture these realities for children better than
26 See In re R.E.S., 19 A.3d 785, 789 (D.C. 2011) (explaining that "[plarental rights 'are not
absolute, and must give way before the child's best interests' (quoting In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d 751,
755 (D.C. 1989))).
27 See infra Part II.C.2.
' See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98, 304-06, 315
(1988) (characterizing parental rights as responsibilities and obligations to children due to parent-child
interdependency); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 894 ("A body of family law that protects only the autonomous
self fails to nurture the relationships between individuals that constitute families."); Minow, supra note
9, at 18 (observing the "critical role of relationships with adults in children's lives"); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 589, 618-22 (1986) (explaining different concepts of interdependent rights, which "emphasize
the ability of rights discourse to express human values and affirm the creative, expressive, and
connective possibilities of rights").
29 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-34 (1973)
(explaining that "[c]ontinuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are essential
for a child's normal development"); Anne C. Dailey, Children's Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L.
REv. 2099, 2155-61 (2011) (discussing children's psychological need for relationships). For a
discussion of relational rights in the context of family law generally, see Shazia Choudhry et al.,
Welfare, Rights, Care and Gender in Family Law, in RIGHTS, GENDER AND FAMILY LAW 1, 12-18
(Julie Wallbank et al. eds., 2010). For a discussion of relational rights and its general applicability, see
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW'S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW
3-5 (2011).
30 See John E. Coons et al., Puzzling over Children's Rights, 1991 BYU L. REv. 307, 308, 343
("Rarely does the state impose specific constraints which override the license of tolerant guardians.");
Martha Minow, Are Rights Right for Children?, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 203, 211 ("The courts in a
sense treat 'rights' as a kind of discourse, or vocabulary in ongoing communal efforts of understanding
[between themselves and parents]."); Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 318 ("The notion that public and
quasi-public entities must make the best interests of the child 'a primary consideration' is not meant to
undermine parental authority . . . .").
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individualistic rights and how relational rights can be used to derive a new
framework for advocating on behalf of children. Such a focus on
relationships, if applied, would create a seismic shift in modem
conceptions of family law, a new dialectic in discussions of children's
rights, and more solid guiding principles to implement children's advocacy
in a variety of contexts.
This relationship-based theory of children's rights follows from
relational theories developed more than a decade ago, by influential
theorists such as Katharine Bartlett, 3 1 Martha MinOW3 2 and Jennifer
Nedelsky.33 These relational perspectives developed in response to a
growing rights discourse focused on individualism, rights, and autonomy. 34
Yet, these perspectives have remained largely in the realm of theory despite
their particular applicability to children's rights.35 Recommendations
flowing from relational rights theories are often contextual, based on a
case-by-case analysis, and include a multitude of factors, which are
difficult and costly to apply. 36 It is also difficult to determine what specific
remedies might flow from general support for relational rights.37
3' Bartlett, supra note 28, at 315.
32 Minow, supra note 9, at 24; see also Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational
Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, t I HYPATIA
4, 20-26 (1996) (analyzing three contemporary approaches to family law and arguing that none take an
adequate account of family life and the family's relationship with the state).
" NEDELSKY, supra note 29. Although Nedelsky thinks broadly that rights are relational, she
specifically discusses her relational perspective's applicability to children. Id. at 19-30, 39.
34 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14
(1991) (asserting that "rights talk" has stifled political discourse in the United States); Bartlett, supra
note 28, at 298-99 (arguing that responsibility "is grounded in relationship rather than autonomy");
Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong to Us All", 74 J. AM.
HisT. 1013, 1021 (1987) (arguing that rights do not include common beliefs about shared interests and
collective rights); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 636 (1983) (asserting that rights talk reflects a male, rationalistic
view of the world); Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 5-6 (criticizing recent works of political and
legal theory about the family and arguing for a new approach centered around the concept of relational
rights); Schneider, supra note 28, at 611 (defending rights talk as necessary for legal change because of
its ability to "articulate new values" and "political vision"); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX.
L. REv. 1363, 1363 (1984) (critiquing rights as expressing the individualism of capitalism); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing ldeals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 401, 404-05 (1987) (defending the language of rights for people of color as significant and
empowering); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1841 (discussing the importance of using rhetoric that
speaks more about competing rights instead of parents' rights in children).
" See infra Part 1.D (discussing how the focus on relationships is not adequately reflected in the
law); Part IV (describing how a conception of relational rights can be used to derive principles for a
new framework for family law).
' See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 28, at 324 ("This dilemma suggests the need for broad rules with
specific, individualized application. Such rules would create a responsibility-based standard that both
assumes, and attempts to measure, responsible decision-making in individual, highly fact-dependent
cases in which parents make competing claims to a newborn."); Ruth Zafran, Children's Rights as
Relational Rights: The Case of Relocation, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 163, 206-12, 217
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This Article moves the conversation forward, providing clear
alternative principles to guide a relational perspective on children's rights
and interests. I derive three principles from relational theory: (1) focus on
proactive state involvement that supports relationships, particularly at-risk
relationships, as opposed to instilling fear of state interference; (2) support
for the multiplicity and variety of relationships through categorization and
clear delineation of responsibilities and rights; and (3) balancing individual
harms against the harm of state interference on relationships in the context
of children's civil rights. I will then demonstrate how these relational
guidelines provide more consistent and practical solutions to promote
children's interests.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I will discuss the power
struggle between the state-centered, parent-centered, and child-centered
perspectives competing to control the children's rights inquiry and
demonstrate how these different perspectives have distinct and potentially
conflicting implications. After explaining how such conflict results in little
guidance and too much tension in applying case-by-case legal standards to
promote children's "best" interests, I will then turn to psychological and
empirical studies for guidance about what we know to be important for
children: financial stability, low-tension environments, and supportive
relationships. 3 8 I will argue that while the importance of financial resources
and stability has been significantly incorporated in the law regarding
children, the centrality of relationships has been undervalued. 3 9 Thus, I turn
to developing a legal framework for advancing children's interests through
supporting children's relationships, keeping in mind children's need for
financial resources and low-tension environments, in developing these
relational principles to guide family law.
In Part m, I will outline the theoretical move from individual to
relational rights and explain why such a move is not only essential to
support the relationships that have been determined, empirically, to be so
important for children, but also better captures the reality of children's
lives. I discuss the current legal framework's reliance on individualistic
accounts of parental rights and state interests in children, in addition to
individualistic accounts of children's rights. I describe how such
individualist perspectives warp and obfuscate the realities of children's
lives: children's interdependence on parents, caregivers, or the state; the
transitional nature of children's maturity; and the way the state must act in
concert with parents to support children. Finally, I will discuss the nature
(2010) (listing eight criteria to use in relocation cases based on a relational perspective of children's
rights).
37 JONATHAN HERRING, RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND FAMILY LAw 27 (2014).
* See infra Part I.B.
* See infra Part IID.
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of relational rights, how they are different from individualistic notions of
rights, and how relational rights can better capture the transitional and
interdependent realities of childhood.
In Part IV, I will demonstrate how this altered perspective affects
legislative policy and legal decision-making in the context of children. I
will describe three essential non-exhaustive principles for applying this
relational perspective in the context of children's advocacy and begin
applying these principles to highlight practical implications. These
principles are broad, but intended to make application of the relational
theory more practical, and less costly and unpredictable than case-by-case
analyses. The first principle seeks to move advocacy for children away
from the focus on the threat of state interference to looking to the state to
proactively support functioning, good-enough relationships-even at-risk
relationships-up until the point of paternal termination. Social welfare
support structures provided by the state should focus on supporting
caregiving relationships and not detached individuals. Such measures
should aim to actively support ongoing care relationships as opposed to
merely providing a safety net when such relationships fail. State-provided
social welfare benefits for child care relationships, direct subsidies,
caretaker support payments, and support for at-risk parents will all be
discussed as following from this principle.
Second, relational theory not only supports relationships, but also
provides emphasis on recognizing a variety of supportive relationships. 4 0 I
will point out the layers of relationships that support children and the ways
the law can recognize these relationships differently so as to avoid tension,
conflict, and alienation. I will discuss the role of formal primary parents,
secondary custodians, and functional parents, as well as tertiary kin
caregivers. These different categories of relationships will be analyzed and
degrees of legal recognition suggested.
Third, room must be made for children to resist relationships and
express their civil rights, so long as they do so within the relational
framework. Both the effect of interference on the ongoing relationship as
well as the extent of the threatened harm to the individual child must be
taken into account. Thus, I suggest the need to balance the way
interference may harm relationships with the threat of harm to the
individual child from lack of interference. I will apply this principle in the
context of disputes of infant circumcision and underage marriage.
' See infra Part IV.B.
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II. CONTRASTING CLAIMS REGARDING WHAT IS "BEST" FOR CHWDREN
A. Different Voices in Advocacy for Children
Children's rights and interests are increasingly central to the law that
affects them. 41 Once treated more like property than persons, 42 the
development of legal standards that centralize the rights and interests of
children in areas such as custody, child support, parental terminations, and
adoption law are significant advances in advocacy on behalf of children.43
However, figuring out how to pursue children's interests has enjoyed much
less consensus than the goal itself.
It is generally agreed upon that children have compromised autonomy
and less capacity for rational decision-making and accountability, although
the extent of such incapacity is debated." In the context of criminal law,
this incapacity is often stressed, while it is less critical in constitutional and
human rights law.45 Social sciences give us a vague picture, but immaturity
is a reality that lends itself to dependency on adult parents and, in their
41 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
42 See Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing
Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1327 (2005) (acknowledging the historic notion that children have been
considered property); Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on
Children's Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53 (1991); Andrew Schepard, Kvell[ing] for Family Court
Review on its Fiftieth Birthday, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (recalling that children were often
treated like the mother's property); Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1807-09
(highlighting a case that reflects the legal tradition of possessive individualism, which treats the child
as "an isolated human possession" (quoting STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 106 (1968))).
4 See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d 1270, 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the
best interest of the child is predominant in establishing the amount of child support); Lisa Myers,
Preserving the Best Interests of the World's Children: Implementing the Hague Treaty on Intercountry
Adoption Through Public-Private Partnerships, 6 RUTGERS J.L. PUB. POL'Y 780, 782 (2009) ("Without
compromising the best interests of the children, the Hague Treaty struck a balance between hard-and-
fast rules and flexible implementation options left to individual governments' discretion."); Sue
Nations, Louisiana's Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1084
(1990) (arguing that "providing for the best interest of the child is always the ideal [goal] sought by
child support judgments"); see also Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the
Best Interest of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 343, 343 (2004) (discussing that international
adoption legislation and practice purports to consider the best interest of the child, specifically referring
to the Hague Convention and United Nations); cf Scott & Emery, supra note 19, at 70-71 (discussing
how the best interests standard is still the dominant standard despite its deficiencies).
" See, e.g., Appell, supra note 2, at 708 (commenting on the U.S. legal regime that governs
"dependency in all aspects of children's lives and agency"); Appleton, supra note 5, at 527 ("[Slome
authorities assume that minors lack mature decisionmaking capacityL] some treat minors as if they
have such capacity; and[,] still others require an individualized assessment of maturity for each
minor."); Todres, supra note 7, at 1145 (noting the significant inconsistencies across the various
maturity indicators).
45 See Appleton, supra note 5, at 528-30 (discussing recent criminal cases where the Supreme
Court invoked research to emphasize reduced culpability of juveniles because of their developmental
immaturity).
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absence, the state.46 Due to such incapacity, children's rights are therefore
different than those of adults, although analogies can be made.47 Children
do not have the same rights to marry, vote, drive, work, sign contracts, etc.,
although older children gradually obtain limited forms of these rights. 4 8
Still, that does not mean that children do not have civil rights at all, 49 or
that they do not have other rights that the state must protect and parents
respect. How precisely immaturity should be managed is subject to great
dispute.
Children's immaturity was once managed by treating dependent
children, unable to support themselves, as property of the parent or state.so
This could be seen in case law that once allowed punishment of parental
indiscretions through loss of custody and the way illegitimate children
were treated as not entitled to support or inheritance.5 ' Children were
subject to the fate parents determined for them with little, if any, outside
regulation. State treatment of children without legal parents was harsh and
unprotected.52
But such a perspective has largely been abandoned by the legal
establishment and, instead, children's incapacity is sought to be managed
in a manner more respectful of the humanity of children. The dominant
alternative is the stewardship model, in which children are not the property
of parents, but rather parents have responsibility for children and an
' See id. at 529 (stating that new research on adolescent brain development is becoming
important in juvenile cases); see also Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain:
Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 158, 159 (2013)
("[A]symmetries in the timing of development of different brain regions contribute to risk taking and
immature judgment in adolescence.").
47 See DwYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 123 (extending adult relationship rights to
children); Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 715, 750
(2013) (stating that there are occasions when the law treats children like adults).
* DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 123.
49 See Appell, supra note 1, at 161-65 (using the implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act
to illustrate the contradiction between civil and dependency rights).
' See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 833, 833-34 (2007)
(noting that parents and the state exercise almost complete control over children in the realms of home
and school, respectively); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 997 (1992) (discussing the historic and
problematic view of the child as private property).
s' See Browne Lewis, Children of Men: Balancing the Inheritance Rights of Marital and Non-
Marital Children, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (noting that illegitimate children were considered
"bastards" and not entitled to inheritance rights); Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary
Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal
Father?, 38 IND. L. REv. 479, 483 (2005) (reviewing the history of illegitimacy and how a child bom to
unwed parents had no right to child support).
52 See BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 93-107 (2008) (detailing the harsh conditions for
children in the foster care system); VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING
SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 56-77 (1994) (discussing the way children were valued for their useful
labor in the foster care and adoption system).
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obligation to act as stewards acting in their children's best interests.53 This
perspective gives parents privacy rights over children, not only because of
constitutional claims to rights to parent children at their own discretion, but
also because parents, it is argued, are best positioned to make decisions on
behalf of children and steer them toward adulthood.54 Relying on the
importance of natural affections, biological connections, cultural diversity,
and civil rights for children, as well as attachment theory and situational
perspective, supporters of the stewardship model argue that parental
privacy rights, and a high level of discretion for parents, are what is best
for children.5' According to this perspective, the best way to promote
children's well-being is to limit state interference to times of crisis and
allow parents to steward their children as they see fit.
Parental privacy is still dominant in U.S. law, both because of the
strength of parents' constitutional rights and because the stewardship
model of protecting children's interests is still the most influential basis for
promoting children's own interests. However, there have been compelling
critiques of parental privacy. Critics argue that parents are given too much
discretion over children and that parental privacy needs to be curtailed in
favor of protecting children's rights in opposition to parental discretion.56
Critics stress the potential for dissonance and opposition between
children's rights and parental rights, arguing that the state must step in to
protect children and preserve their rights and interests in a manner
analogous to the protection of adults' rights.57 Incapacity still being a
primary limiting factor for children, it is argued that the state can protect
children from parents that are not sufficiently solicitous of their children's
" See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 16, at 2401-02 (arguing that framing a parent's legal
relationship to a child in terms of fiduciary responsibilities could be beneficial for both parties).
' See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. iL.
REFORM 683, 683 (2001) (arguing for the parental rights doctrine to maintain diverse family forms and
cultural identities); Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 647-50.
" Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 647-50; see also Appell, supra note 54, at 714
(providing reasons that the privacy of the parent-child unit is valuable, including the fact that "it serves
the political function of rearing children to meet their basic needs and to be citizens").
5 See DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 79-80 (stating that parents are
empowered to restrict children's rights without being required to make decisions based on what is best
for the child); Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination, supra note 10, at 84-86 (arguing that when parents
make choices in pursuit of their own ends, children are forced to bear the costs); Marcia Zug, Should I
Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunfication Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of
the Child, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1139, 1162-64, 1179-80 (exploring arguments that parental rights can
have damaging effect on liberal democracy and arguing for a best interest standard in the determination
of deportation of citizen children).
1 See DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 132, 136 ("As a matter of rational moral
consistency, therefore, we should conclude on utilitarian grounds that in all cases in which the state
structures children's relational lives, and in which children are not themselves in the best position to
judge where their interests lie, the state should act as proxy for the children . . . . In short, it is simply
unavoidable that the state will play a decisive role in the lives of nonautonomous persons, and it does
so quite clearly today.").
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needs and interests. 8 State interference with parental privacy for the sake
of children has been advocated in a range of situations: to protect
children's relationship rights with third parties,59 to punish parental
prerogatives that the state deems bad for children,6 to favor children's
right to stay in the United States when parents are deported, to favor
children's right to not be raised by high-risk parents who have not yet
committed neglect or abuse,62 and to favor adoption and termination of
parental rights, 63 among others.64 The call is to limit natural parental
discretion through state interference in order to better protect children.
Finally, others focus beyond parents and the state, instead looking to
children themselves to effectuate their own rights. They argue for a more
robust vision of children's autonomy and focus on methodology that
respects children's own voices, experiences, and interests-treating them
as subjects as opposed to objects.6 ' This approach applies to all children,
but often is particularly effective with regard to older children who are
better able to express their opinions and more capable of making such
decisions on their own than younger children.66 This perspective asks that
we listen to children's wishes when it comes to custody disputes or when
there is an international kidnapping case under the Hague Convention.67
More expansively, this perspective emphasizes the importance of
considering how children experience legal determinations, seeking to
involve children in mediation, and focusing on children's attachments to
8 Id. at 132.
'
9 Id at 136.
' See Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination, supra note 10, at 82, 119-28 (arguing that parental
choices that are bad for children should have legal consequences for parents).
61 See Zug, supra note 56, at 1179-80 ("The state has a significant interest in keeping American
immigrant children in the United States. This interest, combined with the children's best interest,
weighs in favor of applying a children's rights approach to immigrant family reunification decisions.").
62 See DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 260-62 (suggesting that under certain
conditions parental rights should be abnegated upon a child's birth before abuse and neglect are
proven).
63 See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999) (suggesting that biological family preservation is
overvalued and arguing for policies that better support the adoption process).
' See, e.g., William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional
Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 337-38 (1984) (arguing that infant circumcision is a violation of children's
rights); James G. Dwyer, The Liberal State 's Response to Religious Visions of Education, 44 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 195, 197 (2005) (stating that religious schooling may harm children by discouraging
critical-thinking and self-expression and imposing "gender-stereotyped" roles).
6 See Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1836-41 (arguing that children's voices
ought to be represented in judicial decision-making in lieu of treating children as compliant, silent
objects rather than real, willful individuals with authentic voices).
6 See id. at 1756-57.
6 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
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caring adults.6 8 Child advocates often argue for legal representation of
children, as opposed to ad litem guardianship, in custody proceedings and
parental terminations to ensure advocacy on behalf of children.6 9 Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse is perhaps the most central figure in the child-centered
movement. Woodhouse considers how the "law might be pushed and
challenged to better reflect children's experiences, needs, and interests."o
She asks us to look to children's concerns from a child-centered view,
rather than an adult-centered one." She also encourages us to look at
children's literature and seek out children's narratives, to ask children
questions and listen to children's own voices, and to tame rights talk in
order to get at the needs of children in a "generist," child-centered manner,
that puts the next generation of children at the center of family law.7 2
B. The Policy Implications of These Diferences
The three perspectives described above-parent-centered, state-
centered, and children's voice-centered-are not merely shadows of one
another, but have real and potentially opposing policy implications. The
three models adopt substantively different perspectives on the appropriate
way to resolve controversies involving children, although they all claim to
be focusing on children's interests and advocating on behalf of children. To
fully understand these three different perspectives, the opposing policy and
doctrinal implications must be discussed.
One question that has caused much dispute in the courts and among
scholars is whether grandparents should be entitled to continue
relationships with children despite the objections of legal parents. These
situations usually arise after the death of the parent directly related to the
s See Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1836--41; see also Merril Sobie, The Child
Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Environments, 22 TOURO L. REV. 745, 776-80
(2006) (describing child-centered mediation as a way to include children in child custody and child
protection determinations); Melissa J. Schoffer, Note, Bringing Children to the Mediation Table:
Defining a Child's Best Interest in Divorce Mediation, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 323, 326-27, 329-30 (2005)
(detailing methods of including children in adversarial divorce hearings and mediation).
69 See Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in
Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1671-93 (1996) (arguing
for a focus on children's autonomy and right to counsel in delinquency, abuse and neglect, and custody
cases); Barbara Glesner Fines, Challenges of Representing Adolescent Parents in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 314-17 (2011) (explaining the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for children in child welfare proceedings, and how such representation may not fully represent the
child's wishes).
7o Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1827; see also Appell, supra note 47, at 721-
22, 754-55 (proposing a constitutional "Children's Participation Amendment").
' Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1827.
72 See id. at 1840-41 ("Asking the child question, listening to children's authentic voices, and
employing child-centered practical reasoning are not the same as allowing children to decide. They are
strategies to insure that children's authentic voices are heard and acknowledged by adults who make
decisions. The hard choices ... call for hard listening to children's needs and experiences.").
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grandparents. In Troxel v. Granville,73 the Supreme Court held that a best
interests analysis used in determining whether to allow grandparent
visitation did not give sufficient respect to constitutional parental rights
and that there must be a particular weight or presumption afforded to
parental choice.74 Emily Buss, an advocate of deference to parental privacy
in pursuit of children's interests, has argued that given a parent's ongoing
relationship with her own children, it is best to leave decisions concerning
with whom children should visit to the parent's discretion. She argues
that parents, who are most affected by the visitation that a court could
impose, are best situated to determine how such visitation affects children;
therefore, she agrees with the decision in Troxel.76 Jim Dwyer, on the other
hand, believes firmly in the relationship rights of children and that the state
must interfere with parental relationships to ensure children have sustained
relationships with third parties. 77 Dwyer argues that best interests should
allow courts to overrule parental decisions regarding visitation with third
parties as long as parental opinions are taken into account in a best
interests analysis.78 Moreover, when it comes to parental prerogatives such
as relocation and religious exposure, Buss has more confidence in parental
decision-making as compared to state decision-making, while Dwyer
would like to rely further on best interests and state control in order to
assist children. 7 9 Interestingly, however, both Buss and Dwyer appear to be
in favor of inclusion of functional parents as legal parents when such
parties can demonstrate minimum levels of care requirements.80 However,
once functional parental care meets these minimum requirements, Buss
would argue for presumptions of parental privacy in decisions about
children, while Dwyer would lean on state intervention for protecting
children's interests.8 '
" 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
74 Id. at 67, 69.
" See Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 649,683.
76 Id.
" See DwYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 286-87 (asserting that the idea that it is in
the best interest of a child for a parent to have the right to make decisions about the child's
relationships is illogical and nonsensical).
' Id. at 49.
" Compare id at 17-22, 285-87 (suggesting that the state be given more authority in determining
what is best for children), with Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 648, 654 ("Once the state is
called upon to make individualized judgments about whether a particular choice is appropriate for a
particular child, we should have no confidence that the state can do a better job than the
parent.... [W]e should be slow to allow state intervention if the child's welfare is our goal.").
8 See DwYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 286 (suggesting that conferring the
concept of parenthood more broadly will protect functional "nonparent" parents); Buss, "Parental"
Rights, supra note 8, at 650-52 (suggesting that parental identity be assigned based on the centrality of
the relationship with the child as opposed to other factors).
81 Compare DYWER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 285-87 (discussing reform of the
rules for relationships with functional "nonparent" parents with a focus on the state as the decision-
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Another area of dispute between those who self-identify as child
advocates is how directly involved children should be in custody disputes.
There are those who argue that guardians ad litem are best situated to help
courts make custody decisions in children's best interests 82 and that the
best interests standard can adequately take into account a child's wishes if
children are mature enough to articulate them. Others, however, believe
that guardians ad litem who have to assess what they believe is best for the
child are insufficiently positioned to advocate for the child and that, in a
variety of situations, child advocates who promote the child's own position
should be required, in addition to or instead of guardians ad litem.' This
disagreement also touches on differing opinions about the negative effects
that directly engaging in litigation can have on children." Advocates of
state interference or parental privacy perspectives are more likely to
believe that guardians are sufficient, while child-voice advocates will look
to have children included in the proceeding despite the potential negative
effects on those children.
A third area of disagreement that is influenced by these different
perspectives is how strongly to enforce children's civil rights. Abortion
rights, marriage rights, circumcision, and cultural identity rights are all the
subjects of considerable controversy. On one hand, children may seek the
right to marry at a young age. On the other hand, there is a desire to
protect children by arguing that young marriages are coercively arranged
by parents.87 While these situations may be examined on a case-by-case
maker), with Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 647-50 (arguing that parties identified as
parents should have constitutionally protected privacy to make decisions regarding their children).
82 See John E.B. Myers, Children's Rights in the Context of Welfare, Dependency, and the
Juvenile Court, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 267, 269-70 (2004) (discussing benefits of a court
appointed special advocate (CASA), otherwise considered to be a child advocate or guardian ad litem,
as representation of a child's voice in dependency proceedings).
" See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child's Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey and
Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 629, 640-41 (2003) (discussing the relevance, to varying
degrees, of children's voices in custody disputes); see also D.W. O'Neill, Annotation, Child's Wishes
as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R.3d 1396, 1402 (1965) (discussing the "prevailing view" that
children's wishes are a factor in custody cases nationally).
' See Federle, supra note 69, at 1679-80 (discussing contrasting views on whether a child's
representative should be a lawyer or a guardian ad litem); Fines, supra note 69 (advocating for child-
centered and child-directed advocacy on behalf of teen parents in child welfare proceedings).
85 See Elizabeth K. Strickland, Putting "Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job Description: Why
More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV, 979, 980 (2006) ("The
adversarial nature of divorce litigation negatively affects children, couples, and disillusioned
practitioners.").
' See infra Part IV.C.2. (discussing mature children's civil rights as relational rights within the
context of marriage).
' See Vivian E. Hamilton, The Age of Marital Capacity: Reconsidering Civil Recognition of
Adolescent Marriage, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1817, 1857 (2012) (describing how an adolescent may face
various sources of pressure to marry that include older adult partners, parents, or authority figures, such
as religious leaders).
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basis, the legislative tendency is instead to raise the minimum marriage age
for all and to allow less exceptional circumstances to override the age
limitation. Similarly, children may have the right to cultural identities,88 but
may be too immature to substantively agree to bodily interference involved
with circumcision. 89 Those focused on children's autonomy and rights
separate from parents may want to ensure that children's civil rights are
guaranteed by the state in a manner as close as possible to adult civil
rights. Therefore, they are likely to support children's rights not to be
circumcised when they are too young to consent and, under circumstances
where older children express a will to marry, to support their right to marry
against their parents' wishes if parental consent is required. On the other
hand, those focused on the parental privacy model may want to give
parents discretion regarding what is best for children-allowing
circumcision and necessitating parental consent for marriage. From a child-
centered perspective, one that focuses on children as subjects instead of
objects, older children's desires may be heeded and younger or infant
children's bodily integrity would be analyzed by considering how a child
would experience one outcome or the other.90 Thus, we see how these three
models rotate and revolve around each other-sometimes corresponding
and sometimes differing-but providing three distinct perspectives.
These examples provide broad strokes. They demonstrate the tension
that exists in the current legal discourse. However, there are also areas of
agreement among these three perspectives. All three perspectives, on the
best way to promote child advocacy, appear to be in favor of preserving a
child's relationship with a long-term active caregiver rather than a parent
who had parental rights but no parent-child relationship. Thus, in the Baby
Jessica case, all three perspectives on child advocacy are likely to agree
that two-year-old Jessica DeBoers should not have been taken away from
the adoptive family, the only family she had ever known, in favor of her
biological father who did not consent to the adoption.91 This is because all
three perspectives are focused on how best to advance children's advocacy,
as opposed to a parental rights perspective.
s See Appell, supra note 1, at 154-56 (identifing some of the constitutionally recognized civil
rights of children).
" See Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical
Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?: The Practice of Circumcision in
the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 101-03 (1999) (arguing that the absence of
consent in infants should, as it does with adults, preserve bodily integrity unless a showing is made that
the medical treatment is necessary to preserve the infant's life).
' Cf Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1812-14 (arguing for a child-as-subject,
rather than child-as-object, viewpoint).
" DeBoer v. DeBoer (Baby Jessica), 509 U.S. 1301, 1301-03 (1993); cf Woodhouse, supra note
2, at 315-16, 318-19 (explaining the characterization of the child-parent relationship as an emotional
relationship rather than ownership and describing the forcible separation of a child from her parents as
one of a child's "greatest losses").
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Choosing among these three avenues seems futile. They are all
compelling and relevant in their own way. While often viewed as in tension
with one another, all three perspectives are often part of any inquiry on
behalf of children. Unable to choose, the state normally relies on a "best
interests" analysis to weigh a variety of factors considered relevant to
children's well-being.92 However, the best interests analysis is so broad and
malleable it is open to bias and varying interpretations.93 The best interests
standard can be used as the mantle of those advocating any of the three
contrasting child advocacy positions discussed above, without providing
any resolution. Indeed, the Hague Convention on the Rights of Children,
which uses "best interests" as its guiding principle, has elements of all
three positions throughout the Convention, and even within a given
article.94 Thereby, the best interests standard embraces without resolving
the dilemma of finding resolution between these three perspectives.
This results in many issues being left up to decision-makers without
clear guidelines and acting on a case-by-case basis. The dominant best
interests standard has the benefit of being able to take into account the
range and variety of children's interests-interests in being raised by
parents with privacy, interests in state protection, and interests in adult-like
civil rights.95 Indeed, best interests analysis must take into account many
factors and interests. But such differing interests often come into tension
with one another in difficult and complex cases reflecting lack of certainty
and contested resolutions. Best interests analysis has long been criticized
as ambiguous and extremely difficult for judges to apply, necessitating
costly and difficult proceedings.9 6 It has long been argued, that, despite the
evidence provided by psychologists and social workers, there is no
scientific "best" that can be determined in individual cases governed by the
standard and that efforts to optimize are expensive and largely futile.97
9 Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor in
Awarding Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R.4th 1129, 1134 (1985); O'Neill, supra note 83, at 1399; see also
Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interest-of-the-Child Standard, Judicial
Discretion, and the American Law Institute's "Approximation Rule", 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 83, 89
(2011) ("The best-interest standard is preferable").
9 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
9 CRC, supra note 2, art. 3 ("In all actions concerning children, . . . the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration."). In the context of articulating children's freedom of religion and
thought, the CRC considers in each of three subjections of Article 14, children's own right to freedom
of thought, the rights of parents to decide on behalf of children, and then the state's obligation to step in
to limit such freedoms for public policy reasons.
9 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
* See, e.g., Mnookin & Maccoby, supra note 19, at 71-72 (describing the vast discretion given to
trial judges utilizing the "best interests" standard in custody determinations); Mnookin & Kornhausert,
supra note 19, at 954-57 (discussing the uncertainty involved in best interests analysis).
' E.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 18, at 257-61; Scott & Emery, supra note 19 (describing the
multiple problems of relying on a case-by-case basis); see Appleton, supra note 5, at 528-29
(discussing the lack of a "coherent" scheme in legal disputes regarding children that takes into account
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State determinations of what is best often reflect simplistic understandings
of the benefits of a nuclear family with financial stability rather than the
complex needs of children from unstable homes." Ultimately, the
broadness and contextual nature of the best interests standard, while
appealing, is also its downfall. Often manipulated and abused, it is more of
a goal rather than a legally relevant standard, and has resulted in overly
expensive custody disputes and highly controversial decisions.
C. The Underlying Basics: What We Know Children Need
In light of these fundamental tensions between competing mechanisms
for pursuing children's advocacy in the face of children's limited
autonomy, and the ambiguity of best interests as a standard which is unable
to resolve such tension, it is helpful to take a step back and consider studies
from the social sciences and psychology for insight as to what basic
provisions are most important for children."
1. Money and Low Conflict
Studies have demonstrated two primary indicators for children's
success. The first is financial stability and the second is being raised in a
low-conflict environment. Having sufficient funds for a healthy diet, a
stable house, consistent education without constant moving, and parental
figures who are not constantly in crisis and can provide for children is
essential to children's well-being. A lack of financial stability leads to poor
outcomes for children,100 and can also be an indicator for the likelihood of
parental termination and abuse and neglect proceedings, as well as social
welfare inquiries.101 Indeed, children who face financial hardships do so
because parents are struggling and such struggles often lead to indelible
effects on children. As scholars such as Naomi Cahn and Martha Minow
important topics, values, and policies); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 478 (1984); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody:
The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 267, 267 (1987); Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4 (1987);
Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in
Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1523, 1525 (1994).
* Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 18, at 257-61.
* Such studies are empirically researched and statistically significant considering the large
populations of children they examine, unlike individualistic determinations made by judges, social
workers, and psychologists financed by the parties, which scholars argue cannot make scientific
determinations on a case-by-case basis. See Scott & Emery, supra note 19, at 91-92 (critiquing courts'
reliance on mental health professionals to determine children's best interests).
'0 SeeMELISSA LUDTKE, ON OUR OwN: UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD IN AMERICA 422-23 (1997)
(arguing that limited financial resources, not single parenthood, result in poorer outcomes for children).
o' See Naomi Cahn, Placing Children in Context: Parents, Foster Care, and Poverty, in
COMPETING PARADIGMS, supra note 6, at 145, 150 (arguing that children are most often removed from
their homes because of unstable parental income, citing strong correlation between poverty and child
abuse and neglect).
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point out, focusing on children's financial needs necessitates focusing on
the financial stability of the household.1 0 2
Second, low conflict within a child's home and within a child's overall
environment is an important indicator of child well-being.1 03 Scholars and
social scientists have repeatedly taken note of the way high tension and
exposure to conflict can negatively affect children, particularly in the
context of divorce. 10 4 Moreover, studies have shown that in the context of
high-conflict marriages, children of divorced parents have been better off
than children of parents who have remained married.105 In other words,
while the tension and instability occasioned by divorce undoubtedly harm
children, so does living inside an unloving, potentially abusive
relationship, mired by high levels of conflict. The negative effects of
exposure to violence and high levels of tension, whether due to divorce or
high-conflict parental relationships, have been well documented." The
02 See id. at 145 ("Unstable sources of parental income are the major determinant of children's
removal from their parent's custody, while the severity of child maltreatment is not as strong an
indicator.").
103 See E. Mavis Hetherington, Should We Stay Together for the Sake of the Children?, in COPING
WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND REMARRIAGE: A RISK AND RESILIENCY PERSPECTIVE 93, 101
(E. Mavis Hetherington ed., 1999) (concluding children of low-conflict families are more adjusted than
those of high-conflict families); Paul. R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being
of Children: A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 26, 38 (1991) (comparing children in intact, high-
conflict families with children in divorced families and concluding those in intact, high-conflict
families exhibited lower levels of well-being); Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody and Visitation
Decisions in Domestic Violence Cases, NAT'L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.php?doc id=l134 [https://perma.cc/95
43-KY58] (last updated 2007) (stating that "[e]nthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was
fueled by studies of couples who were highly motivated to 'make it work.' This enthusiasm has waned
in recent years, in part because of social science findings. .. . [For example,] Johnston concluded from
her [most recent] review of research that 'highly conflictual parents' (not necessarily violent) had a
poor prognosis for becoming cooperative parents," and that "[tihere is increasing evidence, however,
that children of divorce have more problems because of the conflict between the parents before the
divorce and not because of the divorce itself' (citations omitted)).
0" See, e.g., David Finkelhor, The Victimization of Children: A Developmental Perspective,
65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 177, 188-89 (1995) (discussing the field of childhood victimization);
Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, 4 FuTuRE CHILD. 165, 171-76 (1994) (studying the effects
of parental conflict on children); Daniel Siegel & Jennifer Mcintosh, Family Law and the Neuroscience
of Attachment, Part II, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 513, 514-17 (2011) (describing the effect of high-
conflict relationships between parents on children).
05 See Paul R. Amato et al., Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-Being
During Early Adulthood, 73 SOC. FORCES 895, 909 (1995) (indicating there are more adverse outcomes
for children of high-conflict marriages that do not dissolve); Susan M. Jekielek, Parental Conflict,
Marital Disruption and Children's Emotional Well-Being, 76 SOC. FORCES 905, 931 (1998)
(highlighting findings that suggest parental divorce following high-conflict marriages can benefit a
child's well-being); see also E. MARK CUMMINGS & PATRICK DAVIES, CHILDREN AND MARITAL
CONFLICT: THE IMPACT OF FAMILY DISPUTE AND RESOLUTION 9 (1994) (finding that high levels of
conflict affect childhood more than family structure).
' See, e.g., INNOVATIONS IN INTERVENTIONS WITH HIGH CONFLICT FAMILIES 41-45, 192 (Linda
B. Fieldstone & Christine A. Coates eds., 2008) (documenting the harm to children caused by
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more children feel their parents are working in harmony for their well-
being, the better for children. While these studies have mostly been
developed in the context of divorce, it is fair to apply them to other co-
parenting and caregiving contexts. When parents or by extension,
grandparents, and other caregivers have high levels of stress between them,
such tension and conflict affect children whether after divorce or between
caregivers who have never been married.o7 The stress and conflict will
also deeply affect caregivers, undermining their ability to care. Thus, in
order to meet children's needs, the value of low-tension environments must
be part of the framework.
Neither the need for money or low-tension environments for good
child development should be surprising or controversial and have been
well developed elsewhere. While plenty of policymakers take these
considerations into effect already, these well-settled studies should be kept
in mind as we continue to evaluate and consider family law policies.
2. Children's Need for Relationships
Social sciences also support children's needs for relationships. The
seminal study of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit attest to the importance of
children's bonds with parents, particularly the primary caretaking parent
with whom the child enjoys the most important bonds and attachment.o8
Building on such work, Anne Dailey provides a psychoanalytic, child-
based perspective on children's rights, relying on psychological sources to
attach importance to children's experiences, most central of which is the
importance of their relationships and attachments, with what she terms
"good-enough caregiving."l 09 She points to the importance of attachment,
fantasy, and cognition as all being essentially dependent on these good-
enough caregiver relationships.ii 0 Dailey stresses the need to take into
account that "the skills of adult autonomy derive from children's earliest
unresolved and ongoing conflict between parents, as well as providing information about high-conflict
families, the effect on children, and the process of parenting coordination).
" Gregory Acs, Can We Promote Child Well-Being by Promoting Marriage?, 69 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1326, 1327 (2007) ("[R]esearch shows that parental relationship quality affects parenting
practices and that children whose parents have high-conflict marriages exhibit lower levels of well-
being than those whose parents have low-conflict marriages." (emphasis added) (citation omitted));
Maron Gindes, The Psychological Effects of Relocation for Children of Divorce, 15 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 119, 134 (1998) ("The research provides mixed results regarding the effect of
contact with the nonresidential parent. For some children, contact with their noncustodial parent was
associated with greater well-being, whereas, for others, it was associated with poorer
adjustment.... Frequency of contact alone is not associated with positive effects for the child. Where
low conflict exists between the parents, contact with the noncustodial father appears to have a positive
impact on children." (footnotes omitted)).
a See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 9-16, 31-35.
" See Dailey, supra note 14, at 3; Dailey, supra note 29, at 2160 (indicating the "good-enough
standard" is characterized by ordinary successes and failures of human relationships).
"o Dailey, supra note 14, at 3, 7-9; Dailey, supra note 29, at 2150.
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relationships with caregivers," and that children should have a right to a
good-enough caregiver relationship, in order to best achieve liberal
autonomy upon reaching adulthood, thus best preserving the liberal
principles of the state."' She argues "[a] psychoanalytic perspective on
children's development gives us a new conceptual framework for thinking
about the rights children should enjoy as members of a liberal polity. This
new framework focuses on children's unique capacities, relational
experiences, and future autonomy interests."1 12 Dailey focuses on
children's rights to maintain relationships, to be free of corporal
punishment, and to have an abortion, based on psychoanalytical forces at
work within children.'1 3
This psychological account attesting to the importance of children's
interpersonal relationships for their development has practical implications.
Dailey argues that based on her transitional view of children's rights, not as
unformed adult rights, but as rights that are changing and adapting as
children mature, the focus on bonds of attachment are central.' 14 Promoting
these bonds should extend beyond those based purely on genetics,
recognizing children's independent interests in ongoing relationships with
non-parental figures with whom they have "primary caregiving
relationships," including those with other relatives, foster parents, and
stepparents.' 15 She argues these primary relationships with caregivers, from
a children's psychological perspective, need to be maintained even where
children are at risk and relationships are flawed, with removal being the
last resort. 16
Other influential studies also support children's need for relationships.
Sara S. McLanahan and Irwin Garfinkel, focusing on children born outside
of marriage, conducted empirical research on the well-being of children
from birth until nine years old."' The study was intended to consider how
children born out of marriage are affected by the lack of a traditional
nuclear family. 118 The study found that indeed, children born outside of
marriage fare worse than children of intact marriages in a number of
different areas.' 19 They are less well-off physically, in regard to obesity and
asthma, and mentally, in terms of academic achievement. 12 0 The authors
." Dailey, supra note 14, at 12.
112 id
"' Id at 13-17.
" Id at 12.
"'Id at 13.
"
6 Id at 14.
"7 Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and Solutions, in
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS 142, 144 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012).
118Id
"Id at 149.
12 Id
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cite four phenomena behind these differences: "(1) [lower] parental
resources . . . ; (2) [less stable] parental relationships . . . ; (3) [lower]
parental investments in children ... ; [and] (4) [poorer] child outcomes." 12 '
McLanahan and Garfinkel's hypothesis is that the nature of the parents'
relationship with children has a causal effect on the outcomes we care
about. 122 Instability in parental relationships, they argue, "reduces
children's life chances by increasing stress and uncertainty and
undermining parental investments."' 23  The authors suggest that the
normative implications of their study are to make direct investments in
children, in the form of health and educational services, and by making
parents and families more economically and socially secure.12 4 The authors
recommend direct investments in children's health and education, reducing
mass incarceration, reducing prevalence of non-marital child rearing, and
increasing the strength of father-child relationships through parenting
programs and marriage support programs designed to educate and improve
parents' relationships with each other and with children.
D. Children's Needs in Legal Context
Based on such studies, money, low conflict, and maintenance of
relationships should be viewed as central tenets of supporting children's
well-being. However, while current family law has clearly been influenced
by children's need for money, low-tension environments, and stability, the
law has been less influenced by the need to maintain relationships. Focus
on child support and its collection, as well as welfare benefit programs
focused on children, demonstrate a focus on financial stability. Emphasis
on collaborative divorce and no-fault divorce, with a preference in many
states for joint legal or physical custody when there is agreement between
parents, and deference to parental rights and authority, all may be said to
demonstrate efforts to ensure stability and low-tension environments.' 25
On the one hand, the strong preference for parental privacy rights
ensures the parent-child relationship, which is often the most important
relationship for children.1 26 Moreover, modification standards in custody
121 Id at 149-50.
'
22 Id at 150-51.
'23 Id at 151.
124Id
" See, e.g., Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020-21 (N.Y. 1978) (discussing the
positives that come with joint custody for a divided family); Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating
Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 427 (2000) (discussing the benefits of collaborative
lawyering for reducing litigation and conflict in family disputes).
" See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (implicating the existence of a
constitutional right of a custodial parent to make decisions regarding the care of their children); see
also Appell, supra note 54, at 703-04 (discussing a parent's constitutional right to primary control over
child rearing).
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decisions are usually more stringent than initial custody disputes,
demonstrating a focus on relationship stability.1 2 7 On the other hand,
however, legal principles are only beginning to recognize the ways that
numerous simultaneous relationships can provide necessary emotional and
physical support to children and that there are situations when biological
parents are not the primary caregivers with whom children bond.1 2 8 From a
child's perspective, if the bond to a caregiver is strong, it can certainly
warrant preservation above a parent's objection.' 2 9  Moreover, if
relationships are central to children's well-being, the state largely fails to
support those relationships in a proactive manner while they are ongoing,
providing instead parental privacy rights and then de facto relief to
children only after relationships break down.1 3 0 Further, for the most part,
parental relationships that have been terminated due to incapacity or
voluntary termination become completely irrelevant post-termination
despite ongoing attachments.131 Even modification standards are gradually
becoming more flexible and reverting back to the more amorphous and
- See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.110(a) (West 2015) (declaring an award of child custody or
visitation can he modified, if in a child's best interest, due to a change in circumstances); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2-204(c) (West 2015) ("A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the
care, custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material change in
circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification would be in the best
interests of the children . . . ."); JUDITI AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 948 (6th ed. 2012).
"n See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11, 19-20
(2008) (examining the advantage of extending parental status recognition to those currently called third
parties or legal strangers); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 314-17 (2007)
(comparing the legal rights of parents with those of third parties and arguing for the broadening of the
category of those who qualify for parental recognition); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal
Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 85-94 (2004)
(addressing the American legal system's current view of a family and arguing for an expansion from
the exclusive family system, which relies solely on the nuclear family for complete childcare); Laura T.
Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. JL. & POL'Y 47, 74 (2007) (discussing the recognition of
community parenting); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:
Towards a Diferentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REv. 419, 421-23
(2013) (advocating for the rights of functional parents, those who function in parental roles despite
having no legally recognized parental status, in a manner differentiated with formal parenting rights);
Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Refraining the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REv. 385, 455 (2008) (discussing a conscious attempt by scholars to address the
changing composition of the American family in light of the current legal construction of caregiving,
which treats nonparents as strangers).
" Dailey, supra note 14, at 13-14.
' See infra Part IV.A (arguing for the development of legal rules supporting ongoing child
relationships).
.3. See Dailey, supra note 14, at 14 (indicating children have an existing interest in maintaining
their relationship with a parent even when parents have previously forfeited this right); see also Annette
R Appell, Controlling for Kin: Ghosts in the Postmodern Family, 25 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 73,
130-36 (2010) (suggesting that relationships with biological parents post-adoption are worthy of legal
protection).
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contestable best interests standard.1 3 2 Also, the need for ongoing
relationships has been increasingly deemphasized in light of other interests
within a broad "best" interests analysis, including a focus on children's and
adults' civil rights, as well as state interests.' 33
Instead of focusing on supporting children's care relationships,
children's rights advocacy has been mainly focused on supporting the
individual child. Such interests are served by focusing on a child's
individual well-being through a best interests standard and viewing
relationships mainly through the lens of state or parents' stewardship. 134 In
the case of older children, autonomy and children's voices also become
involved to a greater extent. These individualistic guiding principles for
children's advocacy insufficiently weigh children's attachment to and
dependency on relationships. In the next Part, I will discuss, in greater
depth, the law's treatment of those individualistic rights and interests, and
thereby expose the shortcomings in advocacy on behalf of children. I will
then introduce the relational rights theory and explain how it can better
support children's relationships.
HI. FROM AN INDIVIDUALISTIC TO A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
ON CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
In this Part, I will develop a theory of relational rights that can better
support the relationships children need as compared to an individual
account of children's rights. I will first explore the nature of the individual
rights and interests at stake-children's rights, parental rights, caregiver
rights, and state interests. Through the exploration of the individual rights
and interests at stake, I will expose the shortcomings of modem law's
focus on individual rights and interests in the context of children's
advocacy by describing how such individualism fails to heed the
importance of supportive relationships. In particular, I will analyze the
limitations of focusing on individual rights as opposed to relational rights
by: (i) demonstrating how relationship-based rights better support the
transitional nature of childhood than individualistic rights; (ii) describing
the intertwined nature of children and their parents and caregivers, which
cannot be properly accounted for through individualism; and (iii) showing
how viewing state interference as a threat to parental privacy misses the
132 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-169.4 (2015) (declaring a rebuttable presumption that relocating
is not in the best interest of the child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West 2015) (necessitating a court
order or consent from the other parent in order for a custodial parent to relocate with their children);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1) (West 2015) (providing that a finding of changed circumstances is not
required for custody if an original custody decree was a matter of stipulation and not litigation, as are
most custody arrangements).
"' See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 18, at 22-33 (discussing the ways that implementation of the
children's best interests standard results in undervaluation of children's relational attachments).
" See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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ways in which the state and parent are jointly responsible for a child's
well-being. I will then introduce group rights and relational rights as
alternatives to relational rights, contrasting the deficiencies of
individualistic rights with the way relational rights can improve advocacy
for children. I will demonstrate how relational rights support the
relationships that children need and better capture the relational realities of
children's lives.
A. Individualistic Accounts ofRights and Interests: Children, Parents, and
the State
1. Children's Rights: Caught Between Individualistic and Relational
Rights
This Article does not advocate for relational rights as opposed to
individualistic rights in order to strengthen parental rights.' Indeed, the
standard argument against a fully child-centered vision of custody is that
parental and societal interests should be balanced with children's
individual rights when determining custody arrangements. Thus, for
instance, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the state's distaste for considering third-
party discrimination is taken into account;1 36 and in Troxel v. Granville,
parental rights are used to disqualify a completely child-centered best
interest standard.137 Rather, I argue that any conception of individualized
rights of children that does not also consider the interests of parents and
society in providing care for children does not appropriately reflect the
nature of childhood, parent-child relationships, and children as rights-
holders. Viewing a child as an individual misses the fundamental
interdependent context of a child's life. Indeed, only through a
relationship-focused perspective can children's rights be accurately
calibrated, and parent and state interests be appropriately limited.
The current law protecting children is dominated by reliance on best
interests of the child analyses, which are individualistic in that they attempt
to focus on what is best for an individual child. Such individualistic
inquiries separate parental rights and state interests from children's rights.
Focusing on rights as individualistic is consistent with the Western liberal
"s Discussion of the importance of parental rights is outside the scope of this Article. For
discussions of the parental rights doctrine, see Appleton, supra note 5, at 540-41; Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1810-12 (critiquing conventional doctrine as being too "adult-
centric," perpetuating the notion that caregivers have a property right in children, and emphasizing
personal autonomy over an interdependent, community-based approach to child welfare).
" See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding racial classification alone cannot
justify the state removing an infant from the custody of its otherwise fit mother).
m See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-61, 66 (2000) (describing the right of parents to
"make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children" as fundamental even
against third parties who have a longstanding relationship with the children).
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tradition of considering human rights and liberty rights to be personal,
individualistic rights.' 38 As Martha Minow explains, the dominant narrative
of the relationship between the individual and society in the United States
is that autonomous individuals have rights against the state and also are
responsible for their own actions.139 In the egalitarian liberal tradition, this
individualistic perspective is true for all conceptual depictions of rights,
including children's rights. 140 For the most part, in our liberal tradition,
rights belong to the individual person, not to a group of persons or to a
community.141
Given the historical process that led to advocating for children's rights
as human rights and the way children were historically treated as parental
property,142 it is not surprising that when focusing on children's rights and
interests it is usually done in a manner that specifically excludes
considering parental rights.1 4 3 Indeed, children's rights are held up as an
alternative to and in opposition with parental rights.'" Instead, it is argued
that only children's welfare is relevant when children's well-being is
involved.145 Many children's rights advocates see a clear binary tension
assumed between children's rights and parental rights as they have
developed and as they are frequently conceived. They fear that talk of
relationships will only lead to undermining the focus on children
themselves. 4 6
'" See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."); David Engel, Concepts of Rights: Introduction, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 489, 489 (1994)
(contrasting the Western liberal tradition of promoting individual rights with the concept of group
rights prevalent in Southeast Asia). For a discussion describing the stratification amongst liberal
scholars on fundamental rights, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal
Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REv. 189, 231 (1988).
139 Minow, supra note 9, at 16.
140 See NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 5-9 (describing the individualistic nature of liberal rights);
Minow, supra note 9, at 15-16 (tracking the origin of competing views of individual rights).
141 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971) (focusing on the individual as the
rights-holder in moral discourse); see also Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 16-18 (describing the
issues that arise when applying individual rights concepts to family law).
142 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
.' Minow, supra note 9, at 19 (describing "instances of state action pentrat[ing] the traditionally
private sphere of family and construct[ing] a direct relationship between the child and state," thereby
excluding the parent).
'" See, e.g., Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 113, 138 (2009) (noting that, while the interests of the state, the child, and the parent may
occasionally be aligned, more often they diverge); Zug, supra note 56, at 1161-64 (arguing that, though
parental rights may have ancillary benefits for children, the doctrine is more concerned with ensuring
"parents do what is best for parents").
145 See, e.g., DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 130 (arguing that "[t]he correct
thing to do is stay focused on the child").
'4 See id. at 128-30
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Barbara Bennet Woodhouse expresses an individualist perspective on
children in her "generist" formulation:
Generism would place children, not adults, firmly at the
center and take as its central values not adult individualism,
possession, and autonomy, as embodied in parental rights,
nor even the dyadic intimacy of parent/child relationships. It
would value most highly concrete service to the next
generation ... as well as collective community responsibility
for the well-being of children.'47
Although Woodhouse values children's needs for relationships, she is
concerned that protecting children within their relationships will result in
"avoid[ing] adult guilt and enhance adult freedom, without necessarily
meeting children's needs for care." 48 Susan Appleton also argues that
relationship-based accounts of children's rights may miss the changing
needs of children throughout their development, forcing them to be stuck
in static relationships. 14 9
Indeed, fear of the way relationships may swallow the needs of
children has prevented sufficient consideration of the centrality of those
relationships and their need for support. I would argue, however, that in
fact a relational perspective is more able than an individualistic account of
children to reflect children's development and increasing independence.
From an individualistic perspective, a child either does or does not have
certain rights, regardless of their age. Except for the right to be heard,
which develops as a child matures, children's civil rights, rights to
relationships, and the right to care span from birth until majority.
Relationships, however, are not static. While relationships are essential in.
harboring children's development,o as a child matures and becomes less
dependent on relationships, the harm to the relationship caused by state
interference is lessened and individualism becomes stronger. Relationships
should not be viewed as static, but as developing with children's autonomy
and independence."'5  As autonomy and independence develop, less
emphasis can be given to the need to respect that relationship and state
interference can be more readily justified. As children transition to
majority, a different balance between individualistic rights and relational
rights can be justified. Adjusting children's rights to account for a child's
increasing independence for relationships will be set out in the relational
context in Part IV.C in which the civil rights of children are discussed, as
14 Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1815.
in Id at 1822.
See Appleton, supra note 5, at 544.
"si See Dailey, supra note 14, at 13-15 (emphasizing the transitional, non-static nature of
children's relational lives).
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well as in the remainder of Part IV where older children's voices are given
more weight in countering relational interests.
Despite the fact that it is logical that the historical development of
children's rights are in opposition with parental rights, children's needs
cannot be sufficiently accounted for without considering their parents'
rights because their needs and interests are intertwined with adult care.
Such care and development are the most important interests children have.
The intertwined nature of parental and children's rights will be further
developed in the forthcoming parts on parental and caregiver rights. First, I
will describe the difficulty in evaluating parental privacy rights and
parental choices apart from the impact of such choices on children, which
complicates states' determinations of when to interfere and punish parental
choices. Second, I will analyze the way caregivers' and children's well-
being are essentially intertwined, making a state's desire to support
children dependent on support for caregivers.
2. Parental Privacy Rights: Difficulty in Discerning Actions on Behalf
of Children and Actions on Behalf of the Self
Parental rights are strong, although they are not as strong as they once
were.1 5 2 The privacy interests involved in being raised by one's own
parents are still part of a children's rights analysis, even in the context of a
broad best interests inquiry.' 53 From the children's advocacy perspective
that this Article takes, the question is not whether parents have a right to do
what they wish with their children, but what power balance between state
interference and parental privacy rights best serves children.'5 4 While some
argue that parental choices should almost always be assumed to be in a
child's best interests,'55 others advocate for more interference by the state
in judging and condemning poor choices, and ensuring that there are
consequences for parental prerogatives that negatively affect children. 56
There are a number of different kinds of decisions that parents make
that can affect children. First, there are parental choices about how to best
raise children.157 Given the subjective and indeterminate nature of
152 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48 (describing how children were once treated more
like property than persons).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 101-05; see also Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 18, at 257-60
(describing and criticizing the best interests standard).
' See DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the central thesis of "what
children are morally entitled to as against the state").
' See supra text accompanying notes 49-51 (describing the perspective that promotion of
parental discretion is what is best for children).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 52-60 (describing the perspective that the interests of
caregivers and children are not always aligned and, thus, worthy of greater state intervention).
' See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that "the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling [parents] to cause their children to attend
formal high school to age 16" when such a practice would burden the free exercise of religion).
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optimization of the different perspectives on the best ways to raise
children, parental actions that are legitimately and credibly taken with their
children's interests in mind-even if the state or others disagree about their
advisability-should usually be respected. This promotes the values of
diversity and accepts that there are real differences of opinion about what
kind of life is best for children."' There are also parental choices that are
not related to how to raise children, but rather are more about parents'
"selfish" desires.159 This second variety of parental choice involves liberty
rights to act in a way that may be partially about care for children, but is
also about parental preferences for their own sakes. Thus, one parent can
relocate for a job that can bring more stability and security to the parent
and child and can also be a job that is preferable to the parent for career
advancement. A parent can increase religious commitment both for his own
and his children's benefit. This mixed-motive scenario is the most
common. In this case, the parental prerogative is part parental discretion
about what is best for the child and partly about what is best for the parent.
The third kind of parental choice regarding children is one made
without any consideration of children, or done in spite of what a parent
thinks is best for his child. These kinds of liberty rights may or may not
affect children negatively, but it is likely there will be some secondary
effect upon them. Thus, for instance, a parent can trade a family car that
helped in carpools and promoted children's safety for a sports car.
Alternately, a parent can move a child to Los Angeles in order to become
an actor knowing that it would uproot the child completely and provide
little security. Or, a parent can become part of a cult that does not permit
him to see his child and thereby clearly harms the child. A parent can
choose to smoke, go on a long vacation, eat fattening food, run a red light,
have too many beers, and so forth-all choices that may not be in the
interests of the child but would be short of abuse and neglect.
Parental choices, whether selfish or instead about their children, are
taken on a spectrum. In other words, even when not making choices solely
for the sake of children, their children's needs may be factored in to some
extent. In Part IV.C, I will consider how, under a relational theory of rights,
parental decision-making can be judged in a contextual, relationship-
sensitive manner. But, it is clear that under an individualistic framework,
the art of judging parental choices, determining whether they are made
with children's interests taken into account or not, and either punishing
parents or interfering in such choices based upon a best interests analysis is
complex, particularly without considering the effects of such interference
" E.g., Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4
(1996) (discussing benefits of cultural and religious diversity).
'"See DwYER, RELATIONSHIP RiGHTS, supra note 1, at 130-34.
7732016]
on children and their relationships, and arguably too nuanced for a typical
state arbiter of children's well-being.
3. Caregiver Rights: The Intertwined Nature of Caregiver and Child
Well-Being
Parents' rights and interests are directly relevant to discussing
children's rights because they are often, if not always, spending their time
caring for children. As Woodhouse argues,
[a] truly child-centered perspective would also expose the
fallacy that children can thrive while their care givers
struggle, or that the care giver's needs can be severed from
the child's, which has [led] to the attitude that violence,
hostility, and neglect toward the care giver are somehow
irrelevant in the best interests calculus.' 60
But there are also caregivers who are not legal parents of children.161
Caregivers take responsibility for the care of children, but caregivers
are also individuals. The relationship between caregiver and child is
particularly complex-there is persistent and constant interdependency
between caregivers and children.' 6 2 The more care a parent provides, the
harder it is to separate the caregiver from the child. A caregiver's needs and
rights become intertwined with the child's life because of the direct effect
of their life choices on children and the constraints in their choices that
raising children places upon them. If a primary caregiver is overwhelmed
and does not have necessary support-both financial and emotional-and
therefore wants to relocate, the interests of the child are interconnected
with that caregiver's rights and interests because a caregiver cannot
provide good care without feeling stable and secure herself.63 Caregivers,
particularly primary caregivers, inhibit their own market work in order to
provide necessary care and therefore their religious, geographical, and
personal needs, as well as their physical safety, cannot be completely
separated from a child's needs and interests.1 6 4 Such interdependency can
be seen to compromise the individuality of the caregiverl 6 5 and minimize
" Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 1, at 1824.
161 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-61 (2000).
162 See MARTHA ALBERTSON F[NEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 106 (2005) (discussing the
interdependency of children and caregivers).
163 See Minow, supra note 9, at 14 (noting that the concept of children's rights has been viewed as
being intertwined with the rights of the caregiver).
'6 See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 2-10 (2002) (discussing how care for children compromises market work).
65 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER: THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 25-26 (1995) ("The presence of children creates dependency
not only because children are themselves dependent, but also because the person who assumes primary
care for them becomes dependent on social and other institutions . . . ."); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
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the independent needs of the child.'66 Interdependency, however, is a
reality and recognizing such interdependence is more important in
supporting children's rights than symbolic gestures.1 67
Therefore as a matter of logic and sheer practicality, it is increasingly
evident that children's rights cannot be promoted without advancing
caregiver rights: "Policymakers increasingly recognize that a society
cannot care for its children without addressing the needs of their
caregivers, who must either be subsidized at home or given the support
they need to participate in the labor market as breadwinners."' 68 if
caregivers' and children's needs are indelibly intertwined, then supporting
children means supporting caregivers as well. Children cannot be assured
care in isolation-the care has to be given by someone who has adequate
financial, emotional, and psychological means to do so.'69
It is not enough to pit parental rights against children's rights and
punish parents who do a less than optimal job-those who are not "the
best." There are not enough parents for children in need; the foster care
system is expensive and overwhelmed.1 70 Parents who are trying to provide
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 139 (1989) (discussing the vulnerability of women in primary
caretaking roles both economically and socially).
16 See generally FINEMAN, supra note 162 (discussing how autonomy is impossible for
interdependent caregivers and for children in need of care).
17 ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL
EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 93-95 (2003) ("[W]hen we are acting as caregivers, we
need not rights that falsely presuppose our autonomy and independence, but rights that frankly
acknowledge our relational reality: when infants, children, or aging parents are dependent upon us, we
are dependent upon others for support and sustenance.").
'6 Woodhouse, Destruction and Promise, supra note 11, at 512; see, e.g., EVA FEDER KITTAY,
LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY AND DEPENDENCY (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, The
Future of Feminist Liberalism, in THE SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY
186, 188 (Eva Feder Kittay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) (positing that while "atomist liberalism relies
on the 'fiction of competent adulthood,' . . . [r]eal people begin their lives . .. in a state of extreme,
asymmetrical dependency, both physical and mental, for anywhere from ten to twenty years"); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency,
8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 16-21 (1999) (arguing that caretaking is a societal debt that
faces inadequate economic and structural support); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 779, 788 (1997) (advocating that the state has a societal interest in ensuring
that the family play a central role in proper child rearing and moral development for children); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism,
and Vulnerability, 46 HouS. L. REV. 817, 824 (2009) [hereinafter Woodhouse, A World Fit for
Children] ("A paramount consideration is the bond between child and caregiver, without which
children cannot learn to grow. The ability to grow and flourish depends on an environment that is fit for
both children and their caregivers.").
6 See, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley, The State of Marriage and the State in Marriage: What Must
Be Done, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 188, 200 (Anita Bernstein ed.,
2006) ("The kinds of measures that would foster autonomy for adults and enable them to provide for
children in their care include health insurance, affordable and quality child care, child allowances of the
kind common in Europe, flexible workplace hours, and paid parental leave for both men and women.").
`0 See Patricia Chamberlain et al., Enhanced Services and Stipends for Foster Parents: Effects on
Retention Rates and Outcomes for Children, 71 CHILD WELFARE 387, 388 (1992) ("Not only is
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good care need financial and legal support for their efforts.171 The United
States has lagged behind other countries in recognizing rights that extend
beyond individuals and relies on privacy and individuality to protect
children's needs.1 72 But, as Woodhouse suggests, "Americans must face the
fact that these concepts are considered foundational in most of our peer
nations." 73 The American focus on individual rights in family law and
beyond impedes the United States' ability to ensure sufficient care for
dependents, which is based on interdependency as opposed to
individuality.' 7 4 We must move from oppositional, individualistic accounts
of children's rights and parental rights-or children's rights and state
rights-to a mutually supportive framework that affirmatively protects
caregivers and the children for whom they care. Support for caregivers is at
the heart of support for children. Support for caregiver relationships is the
core tenet of the relational theory and the guidelines I derive from that
theory as discussed in Part IV.
4. State Interests: State Interference vs. State Responsibility
While states do not have rights, states do have interests that justify
interference in parental relationships with children. These interests can
involve a third party's desire to access children, parental behaviors, the
state's interest in educating children, or society's interest in not allowing
the state to condone discrimination, but also can involve the protection of
children and the advancement of their interests.' 75 Sometimes the state
interferes with parental relationships for reasons that explicitly are not
related to a particular child's circumstances.1 76 For instance, the state has
recruiting good foster homes difficult, but the foster parents who currently provide care are dropping
out at alarming rates."); Nolan Rindfleisch et al., Why Foster Parents Continue and Cease to Foster, 25
J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 5, 6 (1998) ("Nationally, there has been a crisis in child protection service
prompted by a shortage of suitable foster family homes able to provide safe and supportive care when
children must be placed away from their own homes."); Susan Rodger et al., Who Is Caring for Our
Most Vulnerable Children? The Motivation to Foster in Child Welfare, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
1129, 1130 (2006) ("[T]here is concern that the foster system may not be growing at a pace that can
provide the necessary capacity to meet this [growing] need.").
"' Shanley, supra note 169, at 200.
172 See id ("In placing the costs of care on the family, the United States departs from the practice
of other industrial democracies, in which the state assures some floor of social good in each citizen.").
In Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children, supra note 168, at 850.
174 See id at 832-33 ("Our failure to see the child in the ecological context also leads to the
conceptual (and, too often, the actual) separation of the child from her caregivers. A child-centered
jurisprudence cannot be truly child-centered if it excludes the concerns of caregivers. In ignoring the
needs of caregivers, primarily women, we ignore the needs of children."); see also Minow, supra note
9, at 2 ("[W]e need to develop a perspective on children's rights that refrains from comparing the
abilities of children and adults and instead addresses their mutual needs and connections.").
' Zug, supra note 56, at 150-53.
"6 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) ("The effects of racial prejudice,
however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its
natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody."); Zug, supra note 56, at 1172-
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an interest in not deporting its citizen-children born to undocumented
immigrants in order to educate its own citizens.1 7 7 Other times, the state
argues that it acts in a child's best interests, for example, when terminating
the relationship between children and parents accused of abuse and
neglect. 178 But, as others have pointed out, a state's certainty about what is
best for children is often more complicated than it may appear and hidden
state interests may be involved.1 7 9 In the parental termination situation, the
state may also take into account the need to simplify the adoption process
and to make children more attractive to adoptive parents. 80
In other circumstances, the state is fully responsible for the care of
children after parental termination or when children are in the foster
system or welfare system. The state then becomes legally responsible for
the child's care, although it must outsource that care to institutions or to
other private families. In such circumstances, the state's own deficiencies
may affect children-when there are insufficient social workers to track
children's welfare, insufficient funds to support a "good-enough" child
welfare system, and insufficient funds to monitor foster homes.18 The
state's interests and resources thereby become inextricably intertwined
with children's needs and parental well-being. The state is dependent on
the functioning of good enough parents to take care of children or else the
state becomes responsible for systems that are imperfect. The state needs
parents to care for children and has an interest in ensuring that children
develop into good and productive citizens. Upon the failure of parental
care, the state must take full responsibility for children's well-being.18 2
Thus, when it comes to caring for children, the state, parent, and child have
interests that are very much intertwined.
Due to this reality, instead of focusing on parental rights to be free of
state interference or the responsibility of the state to interfere with or
punish parental actions or children's rights to be raised by parents without
state interference, focusing on how the state can best help children within
their caregiving relationships is essential. The state is a reluctant, non-ideal
73 (arguing that the government has an interest in not deporting citizen children along with
undocumented immigrant parents).
'" Zug, supra note 56, at 1172.
in Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination, supra note 10, at 120; see Zug, supra note 56, at 1172.
'" See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children 's Interests: The Case of the Foster
Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 386-87 (1996) (providing "comparative costs" and the
"greater appeal" of traditional adoption to adoptive parents as two reasons why the state may prefer
terminating parental rights to facilitate adoption over foster care).
'8 Id at 387.
I See supra note 156.
'" See Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination, supra note 10, at 123-26 (explaining how states
assume a role of "parens patraie" on behalf of the child in situations where parents are unable to
properly care for the child).
2016] 777
child caregiver. 183 Thus, the state must work as a partner with parents to
care for children-not simply wait for parents to fail and assume custody.
The state and parents need to work in unison, without threat to the parents
of state interference and judgment or parents fighting to keep the state at
bay. For children in particular, the view of state interference as a violation
of individualistic liberty and privacy misses the ways that children are
partially and potentially fully dependent on the state and how parental
rights, state interest, and children's rights are interrelated. Therefore, in
Part IV, the relational theory and the principles I derive therefrom will
discuss how short of demonstrated abuse and neglect, state interaction with
parents should focus on direct or indirect support of parental care
relationships as opposed to threats of termination, interference,
punishment, or judgment of parental actions.
B. Group and Relational Rights and Interests
In the previous parts, I described the nature and shortcomings of an
individualistic conception of children's rights and interests as opposed to
an account of rights focused on relationships. In this Part, I will develop
this perspective on relational rights by detailing what a relational
framework of rights entails and clarifying what relational rights are not.
1. Group Rights
Rights to individual autonomy cannot fully capture the nature of
children's lives: children's dependence on caregiving relationships, state
and parent interdependency, and children as transitional beings, emerging
from dependency on others.185 Private, individual rights cannot be realized
if they are highly dependent on the cooperation and actions of others. Thus,
for instance, the right to coital reproductive privacy'86 is different than the
right to reproduce using surrogacy in which third parties and their interests
in See id. at 122-23.
18 See, e.g., Dwyer, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 258-62 (describing at-risk scenarios
where parents without demonstrated abuse and neglect would have to demonstrate their rights to obtain
custody of their children); James G. Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, 2014 UTAH L. REv. 465, 465-66
[hereinafter Dwyer, Jailing Babies] (arguing that the current prison nursery practices are
unconstitutional and that states should discontinue their use); Dwyer, Parents' Self-Determination,
supra note 10, at 82 (suggesting, to protect children from parental discretion, judgment and punishment
of parents for their bad behavior).
8 See Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 16-17.
' See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that the right to privacy
includes the right to reproductive choices); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(holding that forbidding the use of contraceptives is a violation of the right to privacy and, therefore,
unconstitutional).
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must be considered and upon whom the private right to reproduce is
dependent. 187
Other cultures focus less on individualistic liberty and privacy rights in
defining human rights and more on group and community rights. For
children, such community rights may make more sense given their
interdependency with other individuals. While scholars advocate for
community rights in many other contexts as well,'88 children's rights
provide an ideal focus of the need for an expanded view of rights, since
"[c]hildren, even more than adults, illustrate the dilemmas of freedom-
within-community. ... For children, connection to others is a precondition
to autonomy and individuality."' 89 Woodhouse points to the expansion of
functional parenthood, open adoptions, kin foster care, and other modem
developments as integrating notions of community rights in a manner that
is good for children and has developed in tandem with an understanding of
children's interests.'"0 Other scholars point to family rights as an ideal
application of such group rights. 9 1
'8 JANET L. DOLGIN & Lois SHEPHERD, BlOETHICS AND THE LAw 193 (2005); Dena S. Davis,
The Puzzle of IVF, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 275, 286 (2006); see also Radhika Rao,
Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1117
(1998) (discussing other rights interests besides the parents' rights to reproduce in the context of
assisted reproductive technologies). But see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM
AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 30 (1994) (including the right to use assisted
reproductive technologies as part of the right to reproduce).
18 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 136 (1991) ("The lack of a well-developed discourse about civil society has made it easy
for Americans to overlook the costs exacted by the modem state and the market on the family and its
surrounding communities of memory and mutual aid."); JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (2010); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 70 (1993) ("[P]ersonhood is
involved for the members of each group primarily in the claim of freedom of association whether or not
the group's claim involves property. . . . [Giroup cohesion may be important or even necessary to
personhood."); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 178 (2000) ("[O]nly a group rights
model of ownership of intangible property will adequately protect the works of indigenous peoples
from an ever-encroaching dominant society.").
" Woodhouse, Destruction and Promise, supra note 11, at 498; see also Minow & Shanley,
supra note 32, at 5-6 ("[P]olitical theory and family law alike must embrace these paradoxes in their
entirety, regarding people simultaneously as individuals and as persons deeply involved in relationships
of interdependency and mutual responsibility, and regarding families both as private associations and
as entities shaped by social policy and state action."); Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A
New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 627, 630 (1987) (arguing for support for family
rights alongside individual rights and, when the rights of individuals in the family conflict, for the
weaker and more vulnerable party's rights to prevail).
" See Woodhouse, Destruction and Promise, supra note 11, at 501-03 (explaining that, with an
increased amount of children who lack a traditional family structure, informal communities can help
aid this crisis).
... See Rutherford, supra note 189, at 630 (advocating for "a new theory of family rights
suggesting that fundamental family rights belong both to the family as a group and to each family
member individually").
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Promoting the rights of a community is not the same as promoting
relationships, as will be discussed in further detail below. However,
exploring the idea of expanding rights beyond the individual and pointing
to community needs, rights, and obligations is instructive. Rights imply
freedom from state imposition or duties of support by the state, and there is
no reason that a community or other groups cannot be stakeholders in such
rights. For instance, Jane Rutherford argues that families should have
rights as units and that only when caregiver and children's rights conflict
should children's rights prevail because they are the more vulnerable
parties.' 92
2. Relational Rights and Interests
A system of relational rights to replace individualistic rights has been
promoted by Jennifer Nedelsky,1 93 among others.1 94 Relationship-based
rights take seriously the nature of relationships and the state's affirmative
obligation to support relationships that provide valuable care to children.
The relational perspective is different from a focus on individual caregiver
rights because it focuses more broadly on evaluating and supporting the
role of relationships in the law.195 Likewise, the relational perspective on
children's rights is distinct from the right to relationships and relationship
rights. The right to relationships is still individualistic; it is the right of the
individual to have a relationship with another person, such as a
grandparent, despite parental objections."* The relational perspective on
rights is also not about rights that belong to a relationship. Relational rights
are not group rights that need to be asserted by both members of a
relationship in unison; they are about the responsibility of the state to
9 id.
9 See generally NEDELSKY, supra note 29.
* See, e.g., Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 23 ("Relational rights and responsibilities
should draw attention to the claims that arise out of relationships of human
interdependence."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1225, 1229-32 (1998) ("Conceiving of marriage as a relational contract does not undermine the
normative goals of mutual commitment and relational stability."); see also John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1825-39 (1998)
(discussing relational rights and duties in tort law); Herring, supra note 37 (applying the concept of
relational autonomy to family law generally); C. Harry Hui, Measurement of Individualism-
Collectivism, 22 J. RES. PERSONALITY 17, 17-19 (1988).
19s See NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 245 ("The human interactions to be governed are not seen
primarily in terms of the clashing of rights and interests, but in terms of the way patterns of
relationships can develop and sustain both an enriching collective life and the scope for genuine
individual autonomy. The whole conception of the relation between the individual and the collective
shifts: we recognize that the collective is a source of autonomy as well as a threat to it.").
1" See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 29, at 2166-67 (discussing different instances in which children's
independent right to maintain caregiving relationships comes into play); see also DWYER,
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 11-12 (arguing for the rights of children to have relationships
with third parties).
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protect and support relationships in order to protect and support individual
interdependent children and caregivers." The relational perspective does
not subvert individualism to community or group rights.1 98 The rights
derive from the individual children's rights and flow to support the
relationships themselves.'" This complex perspective of individual rights
within the community allows individuals to be protected within the context
of the relationships that sustain them.
The overarching premise of relational rights is that individual rights
can be sufficiently protected only by protecting relationships, as opposed to
protecting individual freedoms in isolation from others.2 Moreover, the
relational perspective is different from individualistic accounts of
children's rights that factor in the importance of relationships because
according to the relational perspective, relationships are not just one factor
to be weighed into an individual account of children's best interests.
Rather, a relational perspective prioritizes and centralizes the importance of
relationships in a children's rights inquiry, reframing the nature of rights as
one to have those relationships supported as opposed to rights to individual
liberties. Nedelsky argues that rights cannot be secured without developing
autonomy through the fostering of relationships: "If we ask ourselves what
actually enables people to be autonomous it is not isolation but
relationships-with parents, teachers, friends, loved ones-that provide the
security, education, nurturing, and support that make the development of
autonomy possible."20 1
The relational perspective shifts the focus of rights from the prevention
of state interference with individual freedoms to the placement of positive
duties on the state to set preconditions for healthy, beneficial
relationships. 2 02 The goal of the relational approach is to consider what
kind of laws and norms help structure relationships that work.203 Viewing
rights not as the right to be left alone, but as rights to state support for
interdependent relationships is a dramatic shift. This positivist view of the
'" See Minow, supra note 1, at 1882 (discussing the way rights create duties upon the state).
19 NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 87-88 ("A relational approach to rights and to understanding
human selves and values is desirable. Nevertheless . . . the idea of unique and immeasurable value of
each individual remains helpful.").
'" See id at 22; see also WEST, supra note 167, at 93-95 ("That circle of mutual need,
caregiving, dependency, and assistance, is as much a part of our social contract, as is the individual's
relinquishment of rights to self-defense in exchange for a right to protection against violence. A rights
tradition that forthrightly acknowledged the natural reality of our inescapable dependence on each
other-to say nothing of our social nature-would give pride of place to 'relational rights' that would
protect the caregiver, and hence the care bestowed in dependency relationships.").
20 Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, I REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 8 (1993).
201 NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 124.
202 Minow, supra note 9, at 23 (arguing that the juvenile courts should have the ability to use
resources and benefits for youth and their caretakers, including "public support benefits, homemaker
assistance, day-care volunteers, and job training").
203 NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 32.
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state goes against the very nature of liberty and freedoms that set the basis
for U.S. constitutional freedoms.
Nedelsky asks us to build these positivist state obligations from the
starting point of interconnection in lieu of isolation. 20 4 She argues that
individualistic autonomy and rights fundamentally miss the extent to which
it is one's relationships to others that allows us to "become who they are-
their identities, their capacities, their desires-through the relationships in
which they participate." 20 5 She criticizes individualistic accounts of rights
and autonomy; identities and capacities, she argues, are not
comprehensible in isolation from their relationships.20 6 Nedelsky urges that
in any debate about rights that we should consider: (i) what conditions,
including law, have structured the relations that generated the problem; (ii)
what values are at stake; (iii) what kinds of relationships would foster those
values; and (iv) how competing versions of a right would structure
relations differently.207
Nedelsky's argument for a grand shift in our perspective on legal,
political, and moral life goes beyond the realm of children's rights or
family law.2 0 8 This Article's focus is specifically on children's rights.
Putting aside the benefits of a more relational perspective on family law
and legal rights more broadly,2" children's rights are naturally
interdependent and complex, and call for a nuanced relational perspective
that focuses on the question of how the state should support the
relationships essential to children's development. For children, it is
certainly not sufficient to be left alone to pursue that freedom which goes
against the very nature of children's needs and dependence. But, thinking
about children as having only interests instead of rights does not do enough
to counter other parties' firmly established rights-like parental rights-
and fails to capture the sense in which children's interests are human
rights. 2 o Thinking of children's rights as relational rights solves this
dilemma and captures the nature of children's rights in the context of
dependency.
From this broad theory emphasizing the imperative that the law
functions to support relationships, there are a number of clear theoretical
principles that can be derived. First, a relational perspective does not
24 Id at 55.
205 Id at 4.
20 1 Id at 5.
20 1 d at 236.
20 1 d at 3-4.
209 I make no judgment as to whether relational rights are appropriate outside the context of
children's rights and family law dealing with children.
210 See sources cited supra note 1 (discussing the relationship between rights and interests and
outlining specific children's rights that ought to be recognized).
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automatically view rights as confrontational. 2 11 Although ultimately
belonging to the individual and not the community, the law must seek to
protect the individual within a collaborating community. 2 12 As Martha
Minow suggests, the question should not be whether parents have liberty
rights in opposition to children's rights but rather, "what legal rules
governing child custody, education and child support would promote
settings in which children thrive? What rules promote parents' abilities to
create these settings?" 2 13
Second, the relational theory is not static, but evaluative and
developmental, trying to support relationships in a fluid manner.
Autonomy, values, and relationships are not judged to exist or not exist, but
rather, under the relational approach, laws are evaluated as to their
effectiveness in supporting such developing values. 2 14 Therefore, this
perspective facilitates the children's rights conversation because the
perspective matches fluidly with the way children's experiences and needs
develop as they mature. The theoretical description gracefully matches
with the psychological perspective on children's development presented by
Anne Dailey.215
Third, relationships that support children are varied in character, but
may, nonetheless, be worthy of support: "[a] conception of relational rights
and responsibilities . . . would not regard 'rights' as belonging to
individuals and arising from the imperative of self-preservation, but rather
would view rights as claims grounded in and arising from human
relationships of varying degrees of intimacy, what Kenneth Karst has
called intimate associations." 2 16
However, are only good relationships in need of support? Does this
perspective focus on relationships in a manner that can keep children
trapped in bad circumstances? The relational argument is that relationships
are constitutive of who people are, but not that all relationships are good.2 17
211 NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 77 (citing JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS
IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 33 (1994)).
212 Id at 238 ("[Tlhe relational approach is not some sort of collective alternative to protecting
and enforcing individual rights. It is rather a means of doing so.").
213 Id. (citing Minow, supra note 1, at 1876).
214 Id. at 124; see also Wanda Wiegers, Fatherhood and Misattributed Genetic Paternity in
Family Law, 36 QUEEN'S L.J. 623, 627-28 (2011) (explaining that while the law cannot force
relationships into being, it is advantageous for the law to use a methodology that takes into account the
fact that individuals exist in relationships that are essential to their well-being and autonomy).
211 See Dailey, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining that it is important that the law privilege "affective
relationships over individual freedoms" because adult autonomy skills are rooted in early caregiving
relationships); see also supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text (describing Dailey's analysis of
psychological studies emphasizing children's reliance on relationships for their development).
216 Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 23 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980)); see also Bartlett, supra note 28, at 315 ("We may also
want to take account of the different degrees of relationship that have been formed.").
217 NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 32.
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As Nedelsky explains, "[p]art of the point of a relational approach is to
understand what kinds of relationships foster-and which undermine-
core values, such as autonomy, dignity, or security." 2 18 A relational
approach to children must keep the potential harm of relationships in mind.
Indeed, it is still the state's obligation to terminate custodial relationships
involving abuse, neglect, and parental unfitness. Nothing in the relational
approach would change that safety net.2 19 As Anne Dailey emphasizes,
however, the argument is that children are dependent on "good-enough"
relationships, not relationships that are in a child's best interests, which are
impossible to evaluate, involve too much state interference, and complicate
and weigh on relationships that children need. 220 At-risk relationships,
falling between functional and abusive relationships, are the most sensitive
and will be considered below.2 2 1 But, it is only through an understanding of
the nature of relationships that bad relationships can be evaluated and
extinguished.2 22 It is also through an understanding of the nature of
relationships that good relationships can be restructured and supported.223
Relational perspectives on family law have been advanced by a
number of influential scholars who have attempted to capture the need to
focus on supporting relationships and not individuals.224 These
perspectives, however, have not had a major influence on U.S. judgments,
legislation, or legal scholarship.225 Indeed, the liberal individualistic
position holds firm-rights belong to individual stakeholders and flow to
individuals as well. The dominant discourse still involves the same
arguments regarding the centrality of children's interests in isolation from
caregivers and parental interests and the oppositional nature of such rights
remain in place.226 A number of explanations can be offered. First, liberal
ideas of rights, liberty, autonomy, and individualism hold particularly
strong in the United States and despite discussion of how children and
218 Id
219 See Minow, supra note 1, at 1886 (explaining that expanding children's rights does not prevent
the state from intervening and providing a safety net in cases of parental abuse).
22 See Dailey, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that "good-enough" caregiving supports children's
special transitional rights and promotes the law constituting rather than controlling citizens).
" See infra notes 256-58, 260 and accompanying text (describing at-risk relationships between
children and caregivers).
22 NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 32.
224 See Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 4-5, 20 (discussing the importance of acknowledging
peoples' individual and relational identities); Wiegers, supra note 214, at 627-28 (stating that a
relational perspective on rights and responsibilities is important in all areas of law, but particularly in
family law).
225 See Jonathan Herring, Relational Autonomy and Family Law, in RIGHTS, GENDER AND FAMILY
LAW 259 (Wallbank et al. eds., 2010) (stating that the emphasis on autonomy in family law results in a
focus on self-sufficiency and self-determination).
"6 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the oppositional nature of the rights of
children and caregivers).
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dependency are different from such ideals, there is little desire to change
the dominant position on rights. 22 7 Other explanations, however, can be
more readily overcome. Relational perspectives have been introduced most
often in the context of theoretical debates about the nature of rights, and
children's rights have been used as a pertinent example. 22 8 But to translate
these theoretical discussions into practical changes in the law affecting
children, the theory must be made more practical, giving specific
guidelines to courts and legislators about what a relational perspective on
rights entails, how it would translate in case law, and how it would better
support children. In addition, because relational perspectives are based on
context, a number of theoretical perspectives have suggested case-by-case
determinations of what is best for relationships. 22 9 However, such case-by-
case analysis without specified guidelines can be amorphous, subjective,
and difficult to monitor and apply in a consistent manner. Principled
guidelines that do more than ask judges and legislators to make case-by-
case, fact-specific analyses can do more to make this perspective relevant
and influential in children's advocacy.
In the next Part, I use the relational questions that Nedelsky argues
must be asked to parse how a relational framework can promote children's
rights and interests, as well as the general relational values developed by
Nedelsky, Minow, and others to develop a specific set of guidelines for
children's advocacy from a relational perspective. In my analysis of these
guidelines, I rely on the relational theory as well as social science studies
focusing on the need for financial support and low-tension environments in
conjunction with ongoing relationships. The three guidelines I provide are:
(i) focus on state support for ongoing good-enough relationships as
opposed to the state threatening interference with the breakdown of
relationships, particularly for at-risk families; (ii) state recognition and
support of a varied multiplicity of care relationships; and (iii) in the context
of seemingly conflicting positions between children's civil rights and state
or parental interests, the state should balance relational rights with
individualistic civil rights, giving more room for children to express their
individualism as they mature.
m See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (discussing the individualistic nature of rights
in the Western liberal tradition).
228 See sources cited supra notes 205-06.
229 See Herring, supra note 37, at 48 (suggesting that a relational approach would require a case-
by-case analysis).
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IV. REFRAMING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AS RELATIONAL RIGHTS
A. Providing Ongoing Support for Dependent Relationships, Particularly
At-Risk Relationships, as Opposed to Emphasis on the Threat of
Interference ifRelationships Breakdown
Since the current rubric of rights focuses on individual autonomy,
parental privacy, and liberty rights as weighing against state interference,
constitutional law seems to direct states to stay out of relationships for as
long as possible. Parents have the right to raise children without undue
interference from the state.2 30 However, from a relational perspective, non-
interference fails to promote the relationships children need in advance of
breakdown. Before there is harm to a child that could justify state
interference with parental relationships, the state should support these
relationships in a positive, relational, and non-judgmental manner to
preserve and foster the relationships. 231 When abuse and neglect are
demonstrated and parents are deemed unfit, there is no doubt that the state
must step in and terminate relationships that are harming children.
However, such interference comes at a time of crisis-it is traumatic for
the children involved and expensive for the state, as it must find alternative
arrangements for physical custody of children. Foster care is preferred over
institutional care,232 but it is expensive and constrained by a shortage of
good foster parents. 2 33 As a result, social workers are overwhelmed.2 34
2" See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1984) ("The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (holding that a law compelling parents to send their
children to public school until the age of sixteen was unconstitutional because it impermissibly
interfered with Amish religious beliefs); In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998) ("Short
of preventing harm to the child, the standard of 'best interest of the child' is insufficient to serve as a
compelling state interest [under the Fourteenth Amendment] overruling a parent's fundamental
rights."); Williams v. Williams, 401 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Va. 1998) (holding that for "compelling state
interest" to exist under the Fourteenth Amendment, justifying an order of visitation over the objection
of the child's parents, a court must find actual harm to child's health or welfare without such
visitation).
" See Dailey, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that the law should work to preserve child-caregiver
relationships, with removal of the child from the caregiver as the last resort).
232 See RiCHARD GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST
CHILDREN'S LIVEs 163 (1996) (stating that group homes are more expensive for the state and are
generally not appropriate for infants and toddlers); J. William Spencer & Dean D. Kundsen, Out of
Home Maltreatment: An Analysis of Risk in Various Settings for Children, 14 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS.
REv. 486-87 (1992) (relating that in group homes there was more than ten times the rate of physical
abuse and more than twenty-eight times the rate of sexual abuse as in the general population, in part
because so many children in the homes abused each other).
233 Chamberlain et al., supra note 170, at 387 ("Current national trends show that although the
number of available foster homes is shrinking, the number of children and adolescents being cared for
in the family foster care system is growing."); Rodger et al., supra note 170, at 1130 ("[Tlhere is
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Good-enough care relationships are in demand and in short supply. Crisis
management through the child welfare and foster system can be more
costly financially and emotionally than preventative family support.235
Child welfare policy should seek to support-not punish-at-risk families
earlier to prevent the breakdown of the family.2 36 Termination is a last
resort, but the state must step in earlier to support relationships that are
functioning.
While it may be argued on one hand that any regulation, even if non-
coercive and supportive, amounts to interference in autonomy,237 and on
the other hand that even regulation at the breakdown of relationships
shapes relationships by providing punitive warnings,238 a more direct and
effective path for regulation is possible. Regulation can be framed that
takes into account privacy and still supports relationships. There are
concrete steps that the law can take to promote relationships in advance
and thereby avoid the need for interference later on. This is a call for a shift
in focus when it comes to children's rights. Support for caretakers, whether
in the form of subsidies, divorce awards, or education and health benefits
for families, may be much more effective and less expensive than support
for children when families come apart.
concern that the foster system may not be growing at a pace that can provide the necessary capacity to
meet this [growing] need.").
2 See Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System 's Disregard for
the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 55, 78 n. 172 (2009) (stating that
social workers and attorneys handling foster care cases are overwhelmed (citing ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND., THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM REFORM: THE CONDITION OF THE FRONTLINE
HUMAN SERVICES WORKFORCE 9 tbl.1 (2003))); see also Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of
Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 3 (2001) (noting that there was a dramatic increase in caseloads in the 1980s).
" See Shani King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 611
n.171 (2011) (emphasizing that prior to the need for termination, the goal of the child welfare system
should be to support families in a non-coercive manner).
' See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 23, 36 (2005) (emphasizing the need to support at-risk families in a non-coercive
manner); Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right Between Rhetoric and Reality, 31
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 18 (2009) (stating that intervening in family matters through the coercive
power of a court should be an option of last resort).
237 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1062-63 (2012)
(critiquing attempts to non-coercively influence citizens' behavior through default rules).
238 Cf Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1522 (1983) (discussing how legal rules regarding contract enforcement shape
private relationships).
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1. State Support for Relationships
Thinking about how to support relationships before they breakdown
entails a more involved and creative state. 2 39 The Supreme Court has made
clear that under modern law, the state owes no affirmative duties to
children prior to parental abuse or neglect.2 40 Rather, the state functions to
punish bad parents through the child welfare system or even through the
tort system. The state does not get involved in supporting ongoing
caregiving relationships in order to change behavior and the nature of
relationships instead of ending them. Such bureaucracy can be hard for
states and can feel paternalistic, leading to a bigger and more threatening
state that interferes to harm and threaten and not to help.2 4 1
An involved state, however, may not necessarily lead to a more
powerful and large state, but rather to a "change in the way existing state
power is exercised." 2 42 Many applications of such ongoing support to
existing relationships are possible.2 43 Social welfare programs tend to focus
on how to support children in need instead of taking a broader look at the
relationships that are supporting children and how caregiver poverty
clearly affects children's poverty. 2" For instance, welfare programs that
focus on children's healthcare need to keep in mind that children's health is
directly affected by caregiver health and that unhealthy parents are not
likely to be able to support children. Similarly, undocumented immigrants
2 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BuREAucRAcY 7-14, 92-94, 188-90, 279-96 (1986) (providing instances from the Madison,
Wisconsin school district as examples of how informed consent, personal autonomy, and local-level
discretion can foster strong relationships and a sense of community).
24 Dailey, supra note 14, at 14.
241 For instance, state attempts to impose curfews on teenagers have been attacked by parents as
overstepping appropriate state action and encroaching on parental privacy. See, e.g., Anonymous v.
City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593, 596, 600-01 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that the juvenile curfew in
question "impose[d] an unconstitutional burden on a parent's substantive due process rights"); Danny
R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construct and Effect ofJuvenile Curfew Regulation, 83 A.L.R.4th
1056, 1094-97 (1991) (briefing several court decisions that examine juvenile curfews and their
interference with parental rights).
242 See NEDELSKY, supra note 29, at 223.
243 See, e.g., Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REv. 267,
288-294 (1995) (explaining the role government plays in protecting children); Minow & Shanley,
supra note 32, at 22-23; Shanley, supra note 169, at 201.
244 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (2012) (instituting a program designed to, inter alia, "provide
assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of
relatives"); 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2012) (stating that the purpose of the program is to "initiate and
expand the provision[s] of child health assistance to uninsured, low-income children"); Legal
Immigrant Children's Health Improvement Act of 2001, H.R. 1143, 107th Cong. (2001) (stating that
federal medical insurance coverage of legal immigrants applies only to pregnant women and children);
see also Catherine J. Ross & Naomi Cahn, Subsidy for Caretaking in Families: Lessons from Foster
Care, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER. Soc. POL'Y & L. 55, 70-71 (1999) (describing the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program and child welfare policy as focused on the child and not the caregiving
unit).
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who cannot fmd housing or employment are not going to be able to care
for their citizen children born in the United States. Communities that are in
need and struggling are going to produce needy children. The state must
support children by supporting those communities in need, not just by
focusing on the individual children.
Social welfare programs that take pressure off of families by providing
high quality day care, pre-school public education, and low cost after-
school programs focus on children and simultaneously take financial
pressure off of family members supporting those children who are
otherwise saddled with the need to fund such care. Alternatively, state
support for the relational needs of children entails funding care for children
conducted by parents at home. Funding the needs of caregivers and
financially supporting relationships between caregivers and children are
measures that children need. Such measures are not just about supporting
parents; by supporting parents, they support the children dependent on
parental care. Such care is not a matter of privacy under a relational theory.
Rather, state support for such care supports the rights of children to good-
enough, supportive relationships. These services of a more "involved"
state, which the United States has not traditionally been, do not necessarily
interfere with parental discretion because they are not coercive. 245 They
merely foster healthy families and thereby address children's needs and
hopefully help avoid later crisis management.
The Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") is an example of a law that
directly supports care relationships. FMLA allows twelve weeks of unpaid
leave to caregivers who want to care for children or other dependent family
members.246 The United States, however, has lagged behind other countries
in recognizing rights that extend beyond the individual, in relying solely on
privacy and individuality to cover children's needs.24 7 Such support is
unpaid and limited-other countries provide paid leave for as much as a
year and "use it or lose it" paternity leave that incentivizes fathers'
245 See, e.g., Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that there is no
deprivation of liberty interest of parents if no compulsory requirements are imposed); Curtis v. Sch.
Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Mass. 1995) (stating that the type of interference necessary
to support a violation of parental liberty is a coercive or compulsory regulation).
24 Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 261 2 (aX1) (2012).
247 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder,
19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY. L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2012) (stating that the United States lacks robust family
and medical leave protection); Marianne DelPo Kulow, Legislating a Family-Friendly Workplace:
Should It Be Done in the United States?, 7 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 88, 93 (2012) (noting that the
FMLA is a major step towards recognizing the needs of caregivers but still has a number of significant
limitations); Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 697 (2008)
(explaining that employment rights should focus not only on individual rights, but also on larger social
objectives); Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children, supra note 168, at 850 (noting that the culture of
individualism in the United States has influenced the laws and policies towards families).
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relationships with children. 24 8 Such measures allow parents to care for
children and foster relationships, while still allowing participation in the
work force. Such "European-style" financial support endeavors are viewed
as being too involved and "socialist" for the more individualist and private
focus of U.S. regulations. 249 However, a focus on children's rights and
interests demands such measures in lieu of privacy and crisis management
to support caregiver relationships that children depend upon as opposed to
attempting to provide rights to individual children. Such supportive
measures need not overly interfere with parental discretion as they still
leave options to parents as to whether to use such benefits.
Measures such as these may also be criticized as enabling and even
incentivizing absence from the workplace. The focus on private
responsibility and gender neutrality makes policymakers look askance at
measures that may keep women at home.25 0 Families are intended to figure
out how to support their children on their own, without government
assistance.25 1 Such a privacy perspective overlooks child development
studies that clearly demonstrate that one-on-one contact during the first
year of life is best for children's development. 2 52 The private sphere can
accommodate such subsidies if one parent can support the caregiving
parent during this time, but with increasing rates of children born out of
wedlock and the need for two-income families, such a perspective is not
realistic or comprehensive. 2 53 Children need parents to maintain their jobs
and be able to raise them in a flexible and nurturing manner. Children's
rights legislation should, at a minimum, support such care relationships.
Moreover, direct subsidies to families, particularly those in need, can
support care relationships. For example, Martha Fineman proposes a
4 For a review of European family leave policies, see Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad
for Women?: Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
24-38 (2010) and Sandra Simpson, The Elusive Quest for Equality: Women, Work, and the Next Wave
of Humanism, 48 GoNZ. L. REv. 279, 289, 293, 303 (2012).
249 See Nancy Shurtz, Sweden, Singapore and the States: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of
Taxation on the Welfare of Working Mothers, 55 ST. Louis L.J. 1087, 1112-13 (2011) (explaining that
the lack of support for a progressive support system is a result of U.S. political philosophy of "personal
responsibility"); see also Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the
United States Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based on the Swedish Model?, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 373,
392-93 (1996); Mona L. Shuchmann, Note, The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Comparative
Analysis with Germany, 20 J. CORP. L. 331, 358 (1995) (noting that "if the FMLA were truly so
efficient as Congress suggested, then it would not have to be mandated because profit-maximizing
firms would have implemented it").
'o See, e.g., Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1, 41-42,
46-50 (2005) (recognizing that paid family leave may reinforce gender inequality and stereotypes).
' See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1418 (2009) (discussing how abortion and the sanctity of family and
marriage are located in the realm of the right to privacy).
252 Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children, supra note 168, at 830-31.
253 See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text (examining the social effects on children born
out of wedlock).
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system in which the state pays out direct caretaker support payments.254
Although direct subsidies may appear to be radical, a variety of methods
for getting support to families is possible.255 From the state, caretaker
support payments could be in the form of tax rebates, or stipends in a
manner that is not only compensation for the use of day care, but also for
home care. 25 6 Particularly for single mothers or full-time or part-time stay-
at-home mothers, such subsidies can do the hard work of keeping families
functioning and value the work that caregivers do. Such care work consists
of the very basics of child well-being and could help save the family from
breakdown, as poverty is a significant indicator for failed families. 2 57
Any such subsidies are subject to criticism on two related grounds.
First, why should the state fund reproductive choices that are based in
privacy? And, second, how can we prevent people from having too many
children in order to gain access to such benefits?
Clearly, the relational approach sees room for limiting privacy in favor
of support. Individualistic privacy is a value, but is not sufficient to
advance children's needs. Although reproductive choices are grounded in
privacy-a basis that is subject to criticism but persists nonetheleSS2 58-the
children born of such privacy are no longer entirely private concerns, but
also societal concerns. Whether on the heels of the breakdown of
relationships or during support for the ongoing good-enough care
relationships, the state has a role to play. The question is whether that
interference should come earlier to support the relationship or later to
rescue the individual child. Supporting the relationships earlier is both less
harmful to the child, who is then able to avoid crisis, and more cost-
effective for the state.259
Economists critique caregiver/child subsidies by claiming that
subsidies incentivize "laziness" and that parents will reproduce in order to
obtain access to such subsidies-our society does not react well to parents
who perform caregiving in order to be paid.26 0 Furthermore, society has an
a For further elaboration on this proposal, see Fineman, supra note 168, at 26-27.
m See, e.g., Ross & Cahn, supra note 244, at 68-70 (describing Fineman's proposals for
subsidizing private care as radical, but stating that subsidized caring for children is an alternative that
provides some precedent for these more radical views).
256 See t.RC. § 24(a) (2012) (providing tax credit of $1,000 for childcare expenses of qualifying
children); see also Janet Halley & Kelly Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Geneologies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 768
(2010) (comparing the ways in which the United States and Israel provide government-funded support
to needy family members).
257 See Cahn, supra note 101, at 145-50 (noting that "[u]nstable sources of parental income are
the major determinant of children's removal from their parent's custody").
' See, e.g., West, supra note 251, at 1418-20.
259 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
20 Ross & Cahn, supra note 244, at 69; see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and
Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers Be Able to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 Mo. L. REV. 25, 54
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interest in limiting the number of children born to any one family,
especially poor families who are dependent on subsidies and likely to be
the only families who receive state support.26 1 Of course, once a child is
born his need for support is real and cannot be avoided. Such support is
already being provided when child support cannot be collected and to
foster parents once parental relationships break down. Systems that
streamline such payments may save money. Moreover, the state can limit
the amount of subsidy per family as larger families benefit from economies
of scale. Such subsidies can be need-based and depend on a showing of
good-enough care by the family.
2. Caretaker Support Between Parents
Financial support in the form of child support is crucial for children. 262
This notion is well accepted; the focus of reform is on enforcement.263
Reforms that could lead to reduced child support should be viewed
cautiously given children's need for financial support.
A number of scholars have argued that child support alone is not
sufficient for providing the necessary support for care. 264 Rather,
caregiving activities should be supported by primary earning parents as
well. Such calls for support between parents are based on the reality that
caregivers cannot provide care, and a child cannot be properly cared for,
without the caregiver also having financial stability. Caregivers
compromise their own ability to earn in the market in order to provide the
(2009) (discussing the ways in which the value of paid care is minimized in the context of foster care
and de facto parental status).
261 See Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1856, 1900-03 (1971) (discussing the effect of population control policies on different classes);
see also Ross & Cahn, supra note 244, at 70 ("[Elven where the state intends the subsidy solely for the
protection of the innocent child, and not for the caretaker[,] ... the United States has proved reluctant
to provide any benefits for the children of parents who have the financial capacity to support
them. . . .").
262 See supra Part If.C.1 (discussing the effect financial instability has on children).
263 See TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND
THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2009, at 1, 10 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-240.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4R3-KBQ7] (providing statistics demonstrating that the collection of child support
is a constant struggle). According to the 2011 U.S. census, in 2009 only 61% of the $35.1 billion due in
child support was reported as received, averaging $3,630 per custodial parent entitled to support. Id.
' See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, The Costs of Raising Children: Toward a Theory of Financial
Obligations Between Co-Parents, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179, 193-96 (2012) (arguing for
caregiver support payments associated with joint responsibility of parents in childcare); Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Diference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1, 61-65 (2008) (justifying alimony payments based on the need for caretaker
support); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-
Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 215-19 (2012) (arguing for support payment based on
co-parenting responsibilities); Merle H. Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care
or Share, 59 VILL. L. REv. 135 (2014) (discussing the shortcomings of child support and arguing
instead for caretaker support payments when one parent does an unequal amount of care work).
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care that children need.265 It takes money to provide care and the care
provided is valuable and deserving of recognition and compensation. 26
Primary caretakers depend on financial support from partners, just as
primary earners depend on caregiving support from partners. 267 just as
primary earners are able to maintain their higher earning potential when a
relationship ends, reliance and equity as well as children's interests justify
allowing the primary caretaker to sustain an arrangement that allows her to
continue care for children. 26 8
Particularly when a relationship demonstrates a commitment to co-
parenting and a certain balance of market work versus care work between
parents, such support seems justified.26 9 Such caretaker support payments
work best when there is a clear primary earner and a clear primary
caregiver and a prior relationship on which to base such a division between
care and market work. Marriage, in particular, creates a presumption of a
commitment to a shared life and mutual reliance. 2 70 But even without
marriage, if a primary earner and primary caregiver can be identified when
a couple acted together to raise children, such joint parenting could justify
continuing caretaker support so as to support the relationships that provide
the physical day-to-day care for children.
265 See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 264, at 2, 64-65.
266 See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 260, at 75 (stating that "[c]aretaking requires money, is hard
work and is extremely important to society in general and, in particular, to children who are without
care."); see also Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 61 (2002) ("We need to
elevate [child]care to this level of importance [a core value] for the basic reason that it is essential to
human health and balanced development."); Blecher-Prigat, supra note 264, at 199 (arguing that
childrearing costs should be "defined not only in terms of out-of-pocket costs," but also in terms of
"parental costs"); Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71
N.C. L. REV. 721, 787-802 (1993) (discussing the importance of a primary caretaker on a child's social
development); Lucinda M. Findley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1118, 1175 (1986) ("Employers should bear the costs of
[childbearing] responsibilities because childbearing and rearing are crucially important social functions
that are connected to and have major impacts on the work world."); Martha Albertson
Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1403, 1410-11 (2001) ("Caretaking labor
preserves and perpetuates society and, therefore, collective response and responsibility is warranted.");
Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371,
417-29 (2001) (arguing that the importance of caregiving should be considered in shaping and
interpreting the law of employment discrimination).
' See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 264, at 61-62 (arguing the importance of supporting the
caretaking spouse's role even after the marriage terminates).261 See id.
269 See id. at 64-65 (discussing the costs and benefits of being the primary caretaker or the
primary earner in the divorce context); Starnes, supra note 264, at 231-33 (explaining that married
couples with children also enter into a "co-parenting partnership" and "each parent [is] individually
liable for the child's welfare").
" Starnes, supra note 264, at 230-31.
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3. State Support for At-Risk Parents
Parental relationships are either: (i) abusive or neglectful of children
and thus subject to termination; (ii) well-functioning and thus worthy of
support; or (iii) at-risk due to certain conditions, but not yet subject to
termination. While the previous two recommendations for relationship
support are proactive and focus on continuing support to all functional
relationships, there is also room for a special focus on at-risk caregiver
relationships. These relationships may still be "good enough"-or at least
cannot be proven yet to not be good enough-but might also make the
state leery about their likelihood of success. There is room to have the state
step in for the sake of children when harm is feared, even before the harm
is inflicted. Again this is a more involved state than the liberal tradition
may recommend, but such creative and earlier interference may benefit
children and relationships.
Jim Dwyer has argued that at-risk parents should not be automatically
given parenthood rights upon a child's birth, but should have to prove
suitability based on a number of factors that are intended to evaluate his or
her suitability for parenthood, including living situation, parenting abilities,
mental and physical health, etc. 271 Dwyer categorizes at-risk parents based
on empirical studies of particular factors that lead to negative outcomes for
children: parents who have mental, intellectual, and emotional limitations,
struggle with prior or current drug addictions, have a history of abuse and
neglect allegations, have violent criminal records, are imprisoned or are
sentenced to a prison term, are indigent and have multiple children, are
undocumented immigrants, are teen parents, etc.272 These parents, he
argues, are a potential danger to their children, and the state has a
responsibility to step in before damage is inflicted.273
I agree with Dwyer that getting involved earlier in parent-child
relationships for the sake of children makes sense. From a relational
perspective, however, the state should try to promote good-enough
relationships, not threaten to terminate them. Instead of threatening at-risk
parents with termination-creating insecurity and further fear of the state,
which could incentivize hiding and lying to state authorities-the state
should try to positively influence relationships before actual harm can be
demonstrated. Such fragile relationships could use access to parenting
classes, psychological counseling, and social-service counseling. While use
of such services cannot be coerced, they can be offered and recommended
for at-risk parents in order to help avoid parental terminations in the future.
In addition, they can perhaps be incentivized by tying them to state
271 DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 259-63.
272 Id; Dwyer, Jailing Babies, supra note 184, at 470-76 (describing jailhouse nurseries in detail
and arguing that any such programs violate the best interests of the child).
" See Dwyer, Jailing Babies, supra note 184, at 470-76.
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subsidies. Such incentives could apply to all parents, not just at-risk
parents to avoid parents feeling judged.
Of course, at-risk relationships garner more scrutiny from the state,
and, upon a finding of significant harm, unfitness, or abuse and neglect,
termination and interference to remove children may be necessary.274
Providing support may help curb the breakdown and will also allow the
state access to children within this supportive framework, facilitating
findings of harm when they exist. Privacy may often be sufficient for
functional caregiving relationships, but community efforts to help at-risk
parents benefit children born into less-than-ideal situations. The benefits of
promoting such relationships are likely to outweigh the costs of threatening
those relationships, creating fear and insecurity, and ultimately having to
rely on foster care and adoption to support children even before harm is
inflicted by legal parents.
B. Differentiating Different Kinds of Parenthood and Care: An Inclusive
Vision ofParenthood and Kinship Families
Multiple studies have demonstrated the importance of relationships to
children, starting with primary attachment caregivers.275 Recent influential
studies have emphasized the significant advantages for children of two-
parent homes.276 According to McLanahan and Garfinkel, improving
emotional and financial support for out-of-wedlock children is
important. 2 77 In addition to supporting the primary caregiver's relationship
with the child, buttressing father-involvement in children's lives can help
achieve these goals, both because it increases rates of child support
payment and because it gives children the relationships such studies tell us
they need. 27 8 This has led to advocacy for supporting multiple relationships
with both parents, an idea that is also supported by relational theory that
274 See supra Part Il.C (discussing conditions justifying state interference with parental care).
275 See supra Part 1IB.
276 ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD
WITHOUT MARRIAGE 61-63 (2014); see McLanahan & Gartinkel, supra note 117, at 142, 151-54.
m McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 117, at 155.
278 See Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary Critique,
9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 251, 292-93, 293 n.149 (1989) (reviewing and citing several studies supporting the
proposition that there is a statistically significant relationship between joint custody and child-support
payment compliance); Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 643-44 (1989) (noting that parents who perceive that their desires have been met
in custody decisions are likely to comply with such decisions); Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and
Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals,
24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 85-86, 86 n.69 (1990) (discussing the debate over the validity of
empirical work testing the hypothesis that increasing paternal contact increases compliance with child-
support orders); Mnookin & Maccoby, supra note 19, at 75-76 (noting that studies provide "clear
[evidence] . . . that there is better compliance with support obligations by fathers who maintain contact
with their children").
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recognizes the importance of multiple relationships for children. Still, there
are a variety of ways to support multiple caregiving relationships that
reflect different levels of intimacy.
Clare Huntington uses the McLanahan and Garfinkel study's results to
argue for strengthening the relationship between father and child as a way
to fix what is missing for children born out of wedlock as opposed to
children born in wedlock.2 79 Huntington recommends that, instead of
granting single women custody automatically, and thus causing fathers to
have to negotiate custody with mothers or to request visitation from courts,
parents of children born out of wedlock should be deemed legal "co-
parents," which would have expressive and practical ramifications. 28 0
Additionally, she argues that non-custodial fathers should be able to reduce
their child support obligations by providing care, which would be given in-
kind credit against financial obligations. 2 81 Huntington thereby hopes to
incentivize more engaged unwed fathers by reducing the barriers to
parenting and making it more attractive in order to provide children with
two engaged parents in a manner that comes closer to the reality of
children of married parents. 2 82
But these suggestions have the following additional potential
ramifications: (i) they potentially reduce financial support to children, and
(ii) by removing automatic custody rules, they make primary parents' lives
more difficult and less secure because they must navigate custody
arrangements with children's fathers, go to court to get a custody order, and
fight co-parenting presumptions when the secondary parent may not be
meeting his or her obligations. Supporting parental involvement should not
threaten to complicate the burdens of care and support that are already, and
will likely continue, to be placed on the primary caregiver's shoulders. The
co-parenting status is liable to create high-stress situations for the custodial
parent due to contentious co-parenting negotiations that do not provide
clear, navigable rules between parties that are often not on the best of
terms. Indeed, the studies Huntington supports point to drug use and
involvement in the criminal justice system as reasons out-of-wedlock
fathers drift away from their children.2 83 Such fathers may want to be
involved with children, but they also often lead unstable lives and are
likely to have high-tension relationships with the mothers of their children.
279 Clare Huntington, Posimarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67
STAN. L. REv. 167, 202-08 (2015).
2
0 Id at 173-76.
281 Id at 173-77.
282 Id at 225-31.
283 Id at 192-94, 93 n.136, 94 n.148 (citing KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE
BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY 157, 169,208 (2013)).
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As discussed above,2 84 low tension and greater financial resources are
both indicators of child well-being. McLanahan and Garfinkel's study also
supports the proposition that there is a need to strengthen multiple
parenting relationships; 285 but, there are ways to do so that do not decrease
child support obligations while increasing the likelihood for tension. Both
the primary and secondary relationships should be supported; however, in
order to ease tension between unmarried and potentially unfriendly co-
parents, such relationships should be demarcated in a clear manner that
does not necessitate too much negotiation, court involvement, and potential
disputes regarding money and care. 2 86 As Huntington remarks, fathers in
these families often have a different role in children's lives: "fathers view
their role in their children's lives not as providing economic support or
daily caregiving, but rather moral guidance and friendship to their
children." 28 7 Different kinds of relationships can be valuable and should be
legally supported, but they should not be thrown under the umbrella of
"co-parents," leaving the primary and secondary caregivers to struggle
over their rights and needs. Rather, clearly defined and hierarchical
categories of parenting and care relationships should work in tandem and
clear principles should determine when the state should interfere. These
categories can provide clear rules and a balance of power that focuses on
the need of the child to have relationships with multiple parents and
caregivers in a manner that minimizes tension and gives the primary parent
the control and certainty needed.
Therefore, the second guiding principle I derive from the relational
theory is the need to assign categories of caregivers to allow children to
benefit from different kinds of relationships. According to relational
theorists, "varying degrees of intimacy" should be recognized and
supported because care is provided in a variety of ways and forms.2 88
Instead of looking at individual rights and benefits, which causes us to
focus on parental rights versus children's rights, and different caregivers'
rights in opposition to each other, a relational perspective can support
various degrees of relationships simultaneously.
The categories of relationships I will outline delineate formal,
functional, secondary, and tertiary caregivers in a manner that necessitates
support of each kind of relationship, while simultaneously easing tensions
between them. Conflicts can be minimized by giving primary parents
2
8 Supra Part i.C.I.
..5 McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 117, at 151-53.
286 See supra Part Il. B.
28 Huntington, supra note 279, at 194 & n.147 (citing EDIN & NELSON, supra note 283, at 220-
26).
288 Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 23.
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greater physical custody and decision-making authority, while still limiting
such authority to ensure space for functional and secondary relationships.
1. Formal Primary Parental Care
Formal primary parents are caregivers who live with children and are
registered as a child's parents with the state. There can be a single formal
primary caregiver, or there can be two. Formal primary parents have a
legal, biological connection or adoptive relationship with children, or,
depending on state law, they can be defined through intent. 289 Regardless
of the basis for the formal status, such relationships are identified ex ante
and are defined and acknowledged by the state. As I would define them,
formal primary caregivers not only have formal legal status as a parent to
their child, but also either provide at least approximately fifty percent of
children's needed care outside of day care, in home childcare, or school, or
are in a legally defined relationship with another legal parent who provides
such care.290
Formal primary parents have clear responsibility for children at birth
or upon adoption, and it is hoped that they can provide security and
continuous care in low-stress environments. 2 91 Ideally, there will be two
formal primary parents. Two formal primary parents exist either because a
child's parents are married, are in a state-registered cohabiting relationship
with each other, or are unmarried formal legal parents who will be co-
parenting in a cooperative manner with close to an equal partnership.
Formal primary parents provide care to children jointly and in unison.
However, one primary parent is increasingly standard for children and
provides sufficient (if not ideal) care and stability over time.2 9 2
Formal primary parental care is traditional parenthood. As such, it
benefits from being well accepted, understood, and automatically granted.
Formal primary parents receive the bulk of responsibility for children and
provide the majority of care, and their interests are most tied up with those
of the children for whom they care. Thus, imposing upon them unwanted
interactions with third parties or interference from the state generally can
create stress and tension that harms caregivers, children, and their
relationships. For this reason, with regard to formal primary caregivers, the
2 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 435-38, 463-66 (discussing the
distinction between formal and functional legal parenthood).
290 Cf PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03(c) (Am. Law. Inst. 2002) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES] (defining a child's de facto parent as a
person who lives with that child and, for reasons other than financial compensation, "regularly
performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child" or performed a share of caretaking
functions "as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived").
291 Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 465-66.
292 See supra notes 122-29 (referring to the increase in single-parent homes).
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presumption in favor of parental discretion makes the most sense. 293 While
interference is at times warranted, as will be discussed below, more care
must be taken when imposing third-party obligations or interfering with
formal parenting decisions due to the ongoing, interlinked nature of the
care they provide and their children's well-being.
2. Functional Parents and Secondary Custodians
a. Functional Parents
From a relational perspective, caregiving relationships other than those
with formal parents should be differentiated but recognized, particularly if
the relationship is significant and providing necessary care.294 Third
parties, such as grandparents, step-parents, same-sex partners, and others
who are not formal parents, increasingly seek custodial rights or visitation
with children based on their "functional" caregiving activities. 2 95 I have
argued for providing parental status and rights to functional third-party
caregivers because such status makes sense for children, caregivers, and
parents.2 96 Children and formal primary parents alike benefit from third-
party care.297 Status and rights benefit functional parents by providing
recognition and valuing the care or financial support that they provide.298
These functional caregivers provide significant care over a long period
of time sufficient to meet threshold requirements for becoming a functional
parent as opposed to an occasional caregiver.2 99 To become functional
parents, functional caregivers must meet minimal levels of care provided-
usually mirroring the approximately fifty percent of care provided by
formal, primary parents.30 Moreover, such care should be long-term, and
will often, though not necessarily, include a cohabiting relationship with
the child.30 1 A formal, primary caregiver may also be involved in the
relationship, but not necessarily. There can be two functional parental
figures if each provides roughly equal care.
From a relational perspective as opposed to an individualistic rights
perspective, there is less need to separate out rights and interests and to pit
293 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (holding that deference must be given
to parental decision-making on behalf of children instead of using a general best interests test).
294 See Minow & Shanley, supra note 32, at 23-25 (discussing the perspective that an adequate
theory of family law will recognize the various relationships and responsibilities surrounding the
nuclear family in a "constellation of intimate relations").
295 See sources cited supra note 128 (presenting the arguments in favor of functional parenthood).
29 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 438-41.
29 Id at 440-41.29
8id.
`
9 Id at 442-43.
30 See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 290, § 2.03(c).
o' Id § 2.03(lXcXi) (requiring that a caregiver, to be considered a de facto parent, must cohabit
with the applicable child for a period not less than two years); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra
note 128, at 468-69 (advocating for a measure of flexibility regarding the cohabitation requirement).
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them against each other. Instead of viewing formal parental rights in
opposition to functional parental rights, the focus should be on supporting
these relationships in a complementary manner that allows them to coexist.
Thus, a functional caregiver deserves recognition despite the infringement
on the formal primary parents' traditional exclusive parenthood rights. 302 it
is important, however, to also recognize the way in which functional
parents are different than formal primary parents in practice and in theory.
There are significant benefits to the flexible and diverse manner in which
functional relationships develop and meet the needs of children.303 Further,
there are many different kinds of people that. might qualify as functional
caregivers by providing for the needs of children. However, functional
relations are not as stable, predictable, identifiable, or as easily assignable
as formal parenting relationships. 304 They also create a potential
multiplicity of claims that can upset the stable, private lives of children
through state and court intervention.30 s Thus, for the sake of the children
who are the primary beneficiaries of functional caregivers, but also in
acknowledgement of the different potential concerns involved, it should be
recognized that functional parenthood is not equivalent to formal
parenthood.30
Functional parents need status and recognition to best care for children,
to maintain relationships despite conflicts with formal primary parents, and
to facilitate their care of children when it is supported by formal parents. 307
For instance, functional parents need status in order to obtain authority for
healthcare decisions and to act as a legal guardian. 308 However, in order to
minimize tension and allow formal parents to parent with discretion,
formal primary parents should be considered to have priority in care and
legal decisions as compared to functional parents, although legal authority
and a lesser degree of custody can be awarded to functional parents as
well.
b. Secondary Custodians
Parents, grandparents, and other biological kin, may be neither primary
formal parents, nor functional parents, because they do not provide
approximately half of children's caregiving needs. However, they have a
biological relationship with the child as well as a regular and significant
3 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (describing the strong parental rights doctrine).
303 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 456-61.
* See id. at 461-65.
m See id. at 465-71.
* See id. at 473 (acknowledging that functional parenthood has "drawbacks," and that a process
of differentiation is therefore necessary to "create the proper balance between benefits, concerns, and
overall difference").
0 Id at 441.
* Id at 439.
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caregiving relationship. Formal parents who do not live with their children
are the most common caregivers in this category. Even if formal parents do
not have a past relationship with the child to serve as the foundation for an
ongoing care relationship, due to an ongoing commitment, or obligation to
provide child support and visitation, they would still be secondary
custodians from the time of the child's birth. Involved grandparents may
also be in this category, as could a devoted aunt, uncle, or other kin relation
that provides regular and continuous care, or regular financial support to a
child. Other than legal parents, however, these secondary kin caregivers
must demonstrate ongoing sustained care relationships, even if they are not
functional parents, to be considered secondary custodians. Genetic
relationships are important because they create an affinity to children
beyond third parties.309 These secondary caregivers, or secondary
custodians, are not mere babysitters or occasional visitors. They are
essential parts of the network of care provided to children, and have deep
attachments to them based on genetic ties and ongoing relationships.
Nonetheless, if secondary caregivers do not meet certain threshold
requirements, they will not be entitled to functional parental status.:1
When fathers or mothers are secondary custodians, they have been
granted parental rights to have this relationship maintained. The judge will
award them visitation or, more accurately, partial physical custody (less
than the approximately fifty percent joint physical custody, which makes
them formal primary parents). They may also sometimes be awarded joint
legal custody as well. During visitation, fathers usually have full discretion
with regard to their children, unless a court has limited their visitation
rights due to a prior showing of harm.3 1' Thus, visitation can also be
described as partial physical custody. Moreover, fathers are requesting, and
being awarded, greater amounts of visitation time and joint legal custody.
Such fathers are better classified as secondary custodians, rather than mere
"visitors" in a child's life. Maintaining secondary custodian relationships is
incredibly important because children benefit greatly from having multiple
committed caregivers,312 and also because committed parental secondary
custodians are more likely to pay child support.3 13
3 Cf Appell, supra note 54, at 714 ("[N]either genetic connection nor nurturing in themselves
are sufficie it to establish parenthood, but must exist in combination in relation to the child or to the
'mother' (the parent who contains both biological and nurturing relationship to the child).").
310 Cf Dailey, supra note 29, at 2167-68 (arguing for rights to caregiving relationships with
regard to caregivers other than parents).
311 See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 547 N.Y.S.2d 794, 794 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that, absent a
showing of harm, a court cannot restrict a non-custodial parent's discretion and authority regarding
appropriate child activities during visitation); Margaret Tortorella, When Supervised Visitation Is in the
Best Interests of the Child, 30 FAM. L.Q. 199, 200-01 (1996) (describing the high level of discretion
possessed by parents with visitation rights).
312 See McLanahan & Garfinkel, supra note 117, at 149; supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
313 See supra note 307.
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c. Conflicts Between Formal Parents and Functional Parents or
Secondary Custodians
There can, of course, be conflicts between formal primary parents,
functional parents, or those I have defined as "Secondary Custodians." For
legal secondary parents, these conflicts tend to occur when a primary
custodian wants to relocate, modify a custodial agreement, or is otherwise
uncooperative with the secondary parent. With other kin and functional
parents, conflict tends to occur when formal primary parents try to limit or
terminate their child's interaction with kin caregivers. From a relational
perspective, it makes sense to support all of these caregiving
relationships.314 Functional parents should not be disposed of when
primary caregivers disagree with them, or would prefer that they be
removed from a child's life, and neither should secondary custodians.
Still, conflict and tension between caregivers can also be harmful to
children.1 Some argue that to avoid conflict, tension, and undermining
parental authority, parental discretion should prevail over that of other
caregivers. 3 16 These arguments, however, are usually anchored in exclusive
parenthood rights. On the other hand, proponents of the "best interests
standard" argue that children's rights include the right to have relationships
with third parties, and that this right should not be overcome by parental
objections. 317
From a relational perspective, these care relationships should be
supported in a way that not only facilitates their continuity and stability,
but also minimizes tension with formal parents.318 Differentiation and a
clear demarcation of obligations and responsibility for final decisions can
give functional parents, and secondary custodians, the recognition they
need without challenging formal primary parents' primary status. 3 19 A
differentiated functional and secondary custodial status would respect
ongoing primary formal parenthood relationships, but would also
recognize rights to legal decision-making, visitation, and other subsets of
parental rights, even when a primary parent objects.32 o While forcing such
relationships above a parent's objection can be harmful to the primary
formal relationship, such potential harm is outweighed by the potential
3 See Dailey, supra note 29, at 2156-66; Minow & Shanely, supra note 32, at 23-24.
3 For a discussion of the effects of conflict and tension between caregivers on children, see
supra Part II.C.I.
16 See, e.g., Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 647-50 (discussing when parental
discretion should be afforded greater deference).
1 DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 50-53, 285-89.
3 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 460-65 (discussing differences
between functional and formal parenthood and the importance of supporting both types of caregiving
relationships).
3 19 Id at 462-63.
320 Id at 460-61.
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harm of suddenly terminating such a significant secondary relationship;
and, this harm should not have to be proven on a case-by-case basis.321
Therefore, a rebuttable presumption for continuing relationships through
visitation with functional parents and secondary custodial parents should
be applied. The presumption can be overcome by a showing that there is so
much tension between the functional and formal primary parent that
continuing the relationship will significantly harm the formal primary
parent's ability to care for their child. This, however, should be very
difficult to prove. The presumption should work to impose secondary
custodian and functional parent relations on formal, primary legal parents
despite their opposition in all but the most extreme circumstances.322
Moreover, an older child's desire not to be in a secondary relationship
should also be taken into account. If a child does not want to be in a
relationship with a secondary custodian or functional parent, and the
primary parent also objects, this would be evidence that continued relations
may cause significant harm to the primary relationship. However, just as it
is expected that a relationship with a secondary parent should be continued
to some extent despite a child's objection, it should be expected that a child
will have a continued relationship with a functional parent or secondary
custodian other than a formal parent. If a caregiver has reached these high
standards, it should be presumed that stopping the relationship will harm
the child unless it is found otherwise. A child's objection could be
influenced by a formal primary parent or be based on immaturity. That
child's objection, however, can influence the extent of the visitation and
provide cause for serious review.
Ultimately, if grandparents qualify as functional parents or secondary
custodians, their visitation rights should be protected despite the wishes of
parents. However, such grandparents are not just occasional visitors in
children's lives. Only when a grandparent has a significant care
relationship with a child, and terminating such a relationship would cause
harm to the child, would the relationship be subject to a presumption of
protection despite a parent's wishes to terminate the relationship.
Moreover, secondary custodians or functional parents would be eligible to
gain primary physical custody, but only if formal primary parents were no
longer available. If a child is lucky enough to have two secondary
custodians and functional parents fighting over custodial time, some
equitable division of custody can be ordered (visitation being a form of
custody). When individual rights are not involved, thus creating tension
321 Id. at 464-65; see also, e.g., Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547, 550 (Okla. 2000) (determining that
harm must be shown by a grandparent in stopping relations in order to counterbalance parental
discretion to terminate visitation).
" For a discussion of the application of the relational theory to the relocation context, see Laufer-
Ukeles, supra note 18, at 295.
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and opposition, a supportive relational environment that nurtures children
can be created from multiple parental, functional, and kin caregivers.
3. Tertiary Kin Relations
There is a fourth category of adult that may seek contact or visitation
with a child. This person has a close genetic relationship, or a care-based
relationship that is less than functional parent but not both. In this category
are a range of adults, from post-adoption biological parents, surrogate
mothers, and genetic donors to children created through ART, step-parents,
cohabiting partners that developed relationships with children, temporary
foster parents that do not rise to the level of functional parents, and other
potential kin that want access to children.
If parents consent to these tertiary relationships, from a relational
perspective, these relationships can be supported more proactively by the
state through the creation of avenues for legal recognition, including
registration systems and default rules that give tertiary caregivers access to
children as long as parents consent. For instance, states should be willing
to enforce open-adoption contracts, or at least provide legislation that
validates open-adoption arrangements.323 Such legislation legitimizes
tertiary caregivers, even if communication between birth parents and
children is quite limited. I have also suggested giving legal status to
surrogate mothers so that there is an understanding that they may have
limited rights of access to children post-birth. 324 While such post-birth
contact usually happens in any event due to intimate bonds that develop
between intended parents and surrogate mothers, 3 25 recognizing such status
can normalize such relations by creating default expectations.
This recognition transforms caregivers from legal strangers into
engaged components of children's lives. Many children seem to benefit
from connections with birth parents, genetic donors, foster parents, close
relatives, etc.326 The state should not ignore the attachments that children
" See, e.g., Appell, supra note 131, at 92-93 (discussing various ways states handle open-
adoption contracts); Cynthia R. Mabry, The Psychological and Emotional Ties that Bind Biological
and Adoptive Families: Whether Court-Ordered Postadoption Contact Is in an Adopted Child's Best
Interest, 42 CAP. U. L. REv. 285, 323-24 (2014) (arguing in favor of post-adoption contact).
324 See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88
IND. L.J. 1223, 1251-52 (2013) (discussing the appropriateness of providing for post-birth contact
between a surrogate and the baby to whom she gave birth).
325 Id
326 See, e.g., HAROLD GROTEVANT & RUTH MCRoy, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: NEW PRACTICES,
NEW ISSUEs 18 (1998) (comparing the results of various studies analyzing the effects of open-
adoptions on children, adoptive parents, and birth parents); Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO.
L.J. 367, 416 (2012) (discussing an adopted child's need to have connections with genetic donors and
birth parents in order to "be able to 'claim her "identity of origin," defined as a right to know and
explore . . . her identity as a member of the family and group into which she was born."'); Jennifer A.
Baines, Note, Gamete Donors and Mistaken Identities: The Importance of Genetic Awareness and
Proposals Favoring Donor Identity Disclosure for Children Born from Gamete Donations in the
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may develop to these caregivers, and should help create a family law
system that can accept and recognize the need for these ongoing
relationships with kin. Multiplicity involves complexity, but with clear
rules and legal limitations, including hierarchy and a clear division of
power, the benefits of such complexity outweigh the difficulties.
Multiplicity and complexity reflect reality and can benefit primary parents
by providing needed support, and help children get the stable ongoing care
they need from committed caregivers.32 7
However, when there is conflict between primary parents and tertiary
caregivers, these tertiary relationships do not hold as much weight as
functional or secondary custodians in relation to primary caregivers.
Primary caregiving parents, along with functional parents and secondary
custodians, need to be able to raise their children without too many
evolving obligations to third parties and the threat of legal interference.
Parental discretion regarding visitation/access to children should be
accepted unless (i) there is a contractual or other formal legal obligation
with a tertiary caregiver, such as an open adoption agreement or a status
that is imposed by law, through registration if available, or through
legislation, creating legal expectations ex ante, and thus setting
expectations from the outset; 3 28 or (ii) an older child expresses a desire to
continue these relationships. In such cases, the parent would have to
demonstrate harm to the child to prevent the child from visiting with these
tertiary relations. The likelihood of conflict can be avoided, however,
because these relationships need not come with regular visitation rights as
they would for secondary custodians or functional parents. Instead, such a
category denotes legal recognition of the existence of a connection,
allowing visitation to be more sporadic, and the legal recognition more
focused on maintaining contact. Such non-invasive contact should not
cause conflict with primary parents. State rules that set up expectations for
such minimum contacts can facilitate these relationships by recognizing
the status of tertiary caregivers and making presumptions that set
expectations that those who fall into these categories would be allowed
such contact.
United States, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 116, 120-21 (2007) (noting the importance of allowing children to
form relationships with their genetic donors).
" See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 435 ("'The composition of families
varies greatly from household to household.' Ultimately, all these blended, step, extended, complex,
and kin-like ways of raising children are increasingly utilized and provide necessary and needed
support for children." (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000))).
31 If there is a legal agreement or a legally recognized status given to the tertiary caregiver then
the threat of state interference and the nature of the relationships would be clear from the outset,
causing fewer problems of legal threats and the harms of litigation. For an expanded discussion, see
Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 128, at 461-63.
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C. Balancing Harm to Relationships with Harm to Individual Children
This Part squarely tackles the difficult question of when the state
should interfere with parental or caregiver decision-making in ongoing,
functional care relationships. In determining whether to permit state
interference with ongoing important care relationships under a relational
perspective, the harm caused to the relationship by such interference
should be considered. Any such harm must be then balanced against the
harm that a child may suffer if there is no state interference. The more
central the relationship, the more significant is the harm to the relationship.
Thus, interference with a formal primary custodian must be done more
cautiously than interference with a tertiary kin relationship, which can be
justified by the threat of a lesser degree of harm to the child.
There are two kinds of state interference at issue here. The first is state
interference with the care relationship in order to improve care of the
children. The second is interference with the care relationship in order to
protect children's civil rights. In either case, the potential benefits to
children of state interference must be balanced against the potential harm
to the ongoing relationships from such interference.
In applying this standard, by balancing harms to the relationship with
harms to the individual child, the first inquiry addresses how state
interference is likely to affect the relationship that is supporting the child's
essential needs. It seems that in many but not all instances, the state
coming between parent and children and dictating behaviors will strain that
relationship. If a parent has a particular world-view and wants to raise the
child according to that view, the state stepping in and preventing or
prohibiting it can strain those bonds, particularly when that world-view
reflects deeply held beliefs, religious or otherwise. Moreover, the
interference can create parental insecurity and uncertainty, and negatively
affect parenting behaviors and parenting security. 32 9 Forcing education on a
child against a parent's will, forcing a blood transfusion on a child of
Jehovah's Witnesses, preventing children from undergoing cultural rites,
all may be necessary depending on the level of harm to the child involved,
but the effect interference has on the relationship is also relevant to the
decision. Moreover, forcing contact with grandparents, third parties,
surrogates, or birth parents can negatively affect primary relationships
when primary parents object because of the strain infused on the primary
relationship from having to foster relationships to which they object. The
simple act of interference affects the nature of the relationship by second-
guessing a parent's judgment, undermining parental security in parenting
relationships, and by putting space between parent and child. If
32 See, e.g., HAIM OMER ET AL., THE ANCHORING FUNCTION: PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND THE
PARENT-CHILD BOND (2013).
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interference is likely to cause significant harm to the relationship, the state
must be more cautious about interference and balance such harms against
the potential harm to the child of not interfering.
If, on the other hand, interference is not likely to cause significant
harm to the care relationship, and the state believes parental actions are
likely to cause significant harm to the child, or an older child expresses a
desire for such interference, interference in parental relationships is
justifiable even if harm to the individual child is not significant. Indeed, if
the parental relationship is not likely to be harmed, this demonstrates a
willingness to come to a compromise, and such measures as education,
mediation, or negotiation should be encouraged to resolve the dispute and
to protect the child's interest. However, even if significant harm to that
relationship is likely to result from state interference, where the harm to the
individual child is determined to be significant and irreversible by
substantiated evidence, the state may have cause to interfere regardless of
harm to the relationship. In such circumstances, as when a parent refuses to
provide life-saving medical assistance,s3o or when a parent threatens to
sterilize her daughter,33 1 the state can step in, at least temporarily, to ensure
the well-being of the child, by taking temporary custody or overriding
parental authority.
Current law regarding interfering with or punishing parental choices
does not focus on the effect of judicial interference on ongoing
relationships, but rather maneuvers between parental privacy standards and
best interests analyses, where relationships may be tangentially related. For
initial custody disputes, the dominant principle used by courts is best
interests.332 In regard to state interference to protect children's civil rights,
3 See James Bopp, Jr., Protection of Disabled Newborns: Are There Constitutional Limitations?,
I ISSUES L. & MED. 173, 180 (1985) ("[M]ost courts have indicated a willingness to order treatment
over parents' religious objections to improve the health of a child."); Rosalind Dixon & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Children's Rights and Capacities Applied: The Question of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 549, 566 (2012) ("[A]dults, in many cases, cannot refuse essential medical treatment for their
children on religious grounds."); Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine when
Parents Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2000) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court has recognized that parents do not possess an unrestricted
right to make decisions on behalf of their children. The Court broadly proclaimed that parents are not
permitted to make 'martyrs' of their children, which meant that the state could interfere when serious
harm or death to the child was likely to result from the parents' acts of omissions.").
33 See Hazel Glenn Beth & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MiCH. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 39-40 (2000) (stating that judicial authorization is required for the sterilization of a
minor even when the minor's parents and doctor consent to the procedure).
332 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law Institute
Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child's Best Interests, 35
WlLLAMETTE L. REv. 467, 470 (1999) (discussing the use of best interests in custody decisions); Merle
Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1747, 1783 (2007) ("[Cjourts adjudicating relocation disputes strive to arrive at decisions that
are in the child's best interest.").
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the dominant principle is respecting parental privacy.333 In light of the
holding of Troxel v. Granville, parental privacy can also be understood to
be the dominant principle in protecting children's interests with third
parties.334 In modification and relocation disputes, in the majority of states,
the standard leans toward protecting the status quo or parental privacy,
unless significant harm to the child or bad faith can be shown with regard
to the custodial parents' actions. 3 5 Thus, other than in initial custody
proceedings, where best interests analyses are used, parental privacy is
largely respected. Children's rights advocates argue that this status quo is
problematic because it gives parents too much discretion, does not punish
parents for their bad behavior, and fails to put children's best interests
sufficiently at the center of the inquiry.336
The significant harm to relationships standard is intended to be more
permissible in allowing state interference than legal standards derived from
parental privacy that prefer parental discretion unless significant harm to
the child is demonstrated. In particular, when important care
relationships are not likely to be harmed or a mature child can
13 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
3' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000).
.. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-13 (West 2015) (granting the custodial parent the right
to change residence, unless it would negatively affect the rights or welfare of the child); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-108(d) (West 2016) (establishing that, as long as a good faith reason is provided by the
custodial parent, the opposing parent must demonstrate harm to prevent the move with the child);
Morgan v. Morgan, 12 A.3d 192, 200 (N.J. 2011) (holding that a petitioner seeking relocation must
show "a good faith reason for the move and that the child will not suffer from it" (quoting Baures v.
Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 230 (2001))); Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 598 A.2d 482, 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991) (demonstrating the tendency of courts to protect parental privacy absent a showing of significant
harm to the child); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 290, § 2.17(4XaXii) (providing a list of good faith
reasons for a parent's move).
" Compare Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 649 ("[Elven good state decisions about
child-rearing practices are likely to produce bad results when the state relies on resistant parents to
carry them out, and the self-interested or overstressed parent can be expected to do a particularly bad
job of coping with these intrusions."), with DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 123-67
(arguing for more state interference to protect children).
13 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) ("[T]he power of the parent, even
when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child . . . ."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
168-69 (1943) ("It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is
within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that
religious scruples dictate contrary action."); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-39
(1905) (upholding the state's mandatory vaccination law); Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1140-42 (D. Neb. 2006) (upholding a statute requiring parents to submit newborn infants for routine
blood testing); Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French
Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HouS. L. REV. 1, 75-78 (2005) (discussing the
state's role in ensuring that each home-schooled child receives an adequate education); Robert
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 240-41 (1975) ("Every state today has a statute allowing a court, typically a
juvenile court, to assume jurisdiction over a neglected or abused child and to remove the child from
parental custody . . . .").
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demonstrate they are not dependent on such care relationships, this
standard can be a much more aggressive tool than a parental rights
doctrine can be in allowing state interference with parental choices, and
in facilitating actualization of mature children's own will and autonomy.
On the other hand, this standard is more cautious than a best interests
inquiry in avoiding interference with ongoing care relationships. Having
the state as big brother, observing every parental choice, does not make
sense for children or society, as these relationships need support, not
judgment. 33 8 Still, policies can, and should, be put into place to educate,
inform, and encourage parents in a non-coercive manner that advances
children's interests and would inflict less harm on ongoing
relationships.3
Next, I will apply this principle in two specific contexts regarding both
mature and infant children's civil rights: (i) rights to marriage and (ii)
rights not to be circumcised. Only through such examples can the import of
the new relational standard be recognized.
1. Immature Children's Civil Rights
The issue of whether male infant circumcision violates children's
rights to bodily integrity is increasingly an issue of public debate.3 40 States
question the propriety of the practice, whether it is done for religious
purposes, medical reasons, or due to mere custom. 34 1 Most recently, the
338 See Buss, "Parental" Rights, supra note 8, at 647-49 (arguing that a "legal system that shows
strong deference to parents' child-rearing decisions serves children well" because of "[p]arents'
strong ... knowledge of their [children's] needs" and that, therefore, "we should be slow to allow state
intervention if... child[] welfare is our goal").
` See Helen M. Alvar6, A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen's Regulating Reproduction:
The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 8, 11-12 (2012) (suggesting that the
state should act to exhort and influence in order to encourage, but not coerce, good parenting); Shelly
Kierstead, Parent Education Programs in Family Courts: Balancing Autonomy and State Intervention,
49 FAM. CT. REV. 140, 141-47 (2011) (advocating for use of voluntary and "quasi-mandatory" parent
education programs to resolve legal disputes where children are involved because they are consistent
with "the state's role ... [in] assess[ing] child-rearing practices as they relate to the needs of the child
[rather than] ... actively requir[ing] changing those practices").
" See Dena S. Davis, Male and Female Genital Alteration: A Collision Course with the Law?,
11 HEALTH MATRIX 487, 555-60 (2001) (describing controversy surrounding circumcision within the
Jewish community and the rationale for the procedure); Povenmire, supra note 89, at 105-06 (arguing
that constitutional considerations with respect to "the [right] of [a] minor to bodily integrity" may
outweigh parental consent for infant circumcision); Kimberly A. Greenfield, Note, Cutting Away
Religious Freedom: The Global and National Debate Surrounding Male Circumcision, 15 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 353, 359-70 (2014) (describing the contentious history of circumcision in Germany,
Sweden, and the United States, and detailing proposed, and enacted, recent legislation related to the
practice in the United States).
"i See, e.g., Bijan Fatch-Moghadam, Criminalizing Male Circumcision? Case Note: Landgericht
Cologne, Judgment of 7 May 2012-No. 151 NS 169/11, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1131, 1133-36 (2012)
(commenting on a 2012 decision of a German court, which grappled with the many issues surrounding
infant circumcision).
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ("PACE") passed a
resolution entitled "Children's Right to Physical Integrity," which
expressed concern over the practice and recommended that European states
consider placing restrictions on it.3 42 Indeed, there are studies that indicate
lasting traumatic harm to children resulting from infant circumcision.343 On
the other hand, there are many other studies that indicate benefits of male
circumcision for health reasons.3 " Indeed, no major medical association
either bans or universally recommends the procedure due to conflicting
studies and opinions on the effects of the practice.345 Given these
conflicting studies, the European objections are based more on the mere act
of physically "mutilating" a child's body when there is no medical
urgency, commonly pointing to a child's right to bodily integrity as the
justification, as opposed to clear evidence of harm.346 The child's best
interests approach gives little help in resolving such issues because the
benefit of bodily integrity must also be weighed against parental interests
in religious freedom, children's right to parental privacy, and to religious
identification.3 47
In comparison, the relational perspective can provide more guidance
342 Resolution on Children's Right to Physical Integrity, EuR. PARL. Doc. 1952 (2013), http://
assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRelXref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FilelD=20174&lang=EN [https://perma.cc/7
VR2-CQP9] (follow "Download" hyperlink).
" See, e.g., William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional
Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 337-38 (1984) (describing neonatal circumcision as a "barbarous ...
practice(]" and analogizing it to other, more commonly acknowledged forms of child abuse); T.
Hammond, A Preliminary Poll of Men Circumcised in Infancy or Childhood, 83 BRIT. J. UROLOGY
INT'L, Supp. 1, at 85, 85-87 (1999) (presenting the findings of several studies to suggest that, among
certain populations, circumcision may lead to various physical, sexual, or psychological consequences
later in life); Anna Taddio et al., Effect of Neonatal Circumcision on Pain Response During Subsequent
Routine Vaccination, 349 LANCET 599, 602 (1997) (indicating that infants may experience post-
traumatic stress disorder from circumcision); Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 686, 688
(1999) (describing pain and stress experienced by newborns who undergo circumcision without any
pain relief); Christopher Maden et al., History of Circumcision, Medical Conditions, and Sexual
Activity and Risk of Penile Cancer, 85 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 19, 19-24 (1993) (presenting
epidemiological findings to suggest that circumcision is a risk factor for penile cancer).
' See, e.g., Report of the Task Force on Circumcision, 84 PEDIATRICS 388, 388 (1989)
(suggesting that neonatal circumcision has medical benefits related to the "incidence of urinary tract
infection[,] ... sexually transmitted diseases and[] . . . cancer"); Edward C. Green, The Circumcision
and AIDS Debate, 41 ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS 22, 22 (2000) (discussing debate surrounding benefits of
male circumcision in preventing the spread of AIDS).
" See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Task Force on Circumcision, 56 PEDIATRICS 610, 610-11
(1975) (concluding that no valid medical reasons for routine circumcision exist but not banning the
practice either as harmful to infants).
" Resolution on Children's Right to Physical Integrity, supra note 342. Indeed, in its 2013
resolution entitled "Children's Right to Physical Integrity," PACE expressed "particularl worr[y]
about ... violation of the physical integrity of children." Id.
" See Rhona Schuz, The Dangers of Children's Rights Discourse in the Political Arena: The
Issue of Religious Male Circumcision as a Test Case, 21 CARDOzO J.L. & GENDER 347, 370-72 (2015)
(discussing certain rights of children, "which are highly relevant to the circumcision debate," including
the rights to freedom of religion and culture, parental privacy, and self-identity).
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by infusing considerations of balancing individual rights with
consideration of harm to relationships. The question is: what effect would
state prevention of male circumcision have upon the parental relationship
with children? For example, if the parents are circumcising their children
due to custom or convenience, then state intervention with this decision
would likely not harm the parental relationship. And, if the state believed
that circumcision would cause harm to children, even if significant harm
cannot be proven, then it is likely that mere education and provision of
information, even in a non-conflicting manner, would be sufficient
interference to drastically reduce circumcision of convenience or custom.
Likewise, if male circumcision were done for health concerns, the state
could provide information to put forward its own position on the matter.
Indeed, circumcision for health reasons has been reduced dramatically due
to a change in medical opinions about its utility and the potential effects.34 8
Doctors who perform these health-related circumcisions could be asked to
provide the state's perspective on this matter.
However, when circumcision is done for religious reasons, or deeply
held cultural reasons, much more is at stake. Male circumcision is a basic
tenet of both Jewish and Islamic law.3 49 For example, not circumcising a
child within Judaism removes the child from the religious community,
although, according to Jewish law, he is still considered Jewish."'o Indeed,
circumcision is considered a religious obligation in Judaism, 3 5 1 and either a
religious obligation or a basic tradition in Islam depending on different
opinions.352 Similarly, many Christians also believe in a religious basis of
" See, e.g., Marie Fox & Michael Thompson, Cutting It: Surgical Intervention and the Sexing of
Children, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 81, 86, 96 (2005) (arguing for education about circumcision to
reduce its occurrence); Elisabeth McDonald, Circumcision and the Criminal Law: The Challenge for a
Multicultural State, 21 N.Z.U. L. REv. 233, 265 (2004) (recognizing several foreign countries that have
seen a reduction in circumcision, which have resulted from "dissemination of ... medical research" on
the procedure).
3 See Genesis 17:10 (King James) ("This is My covenant ... between me and you and thy seed
after thee[:] Every man child among you shall be circumcised."). The commandment of circumcision of
male newborns on the eighth day is repeated again in Leviticus 12:3 (King James).
` See ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 570 (1971) ("It is a Jewish father's duty to have his son
circumcised.. .. [However, circumcision] is not a sacrament, and any child born of a Jewish mother is
a Jew, whether circumcised or not.").
3' Indeed, the leading Rabbinical codex of Jewish law, the Shulchan Aruch, written by Rabbi
Yosef Karo in the 16th century, states that the commandment to circumcise one's son is greater than
the other positive commandments. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 260:1 (reciting commandment to
circumcise). Circumcision is the obligation of a Jewish father, and he is in derogation of his religious
duties to God, the community, and to his son, if he fails to have it done. ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 570
(1972). Upon such an occurrence, other members of the community, or the young man himself when he
is mature must arrange for the circumcision. See id. at 567-71 (discussing history and traditional
background of circumcision).
352 Circumcision of Boys, BBC ONLINE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islam
ethics/malecircumcision.shtml [https://perma.cc/QN62-LNF9] (last updated Aug. 13, 2009); Khitan,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA ISLAM (P. Bearman et al. eds., 2d ed., Brill Online 2015),
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the practice. As a result, not circumcising a child is considered to have a
negative religious effect on the child and on religious parents, thereby
potentially harming the parental relationship. Parents would hopefully not
punish children for state prohibitions, but nonetheless state interference
and undermining of parental authority could harm parenting relationships
and by extension the child. Parents are likely to leave the state or disobey
the law, which can result in legal penalty, in furtherance of their religious
beliefs. Certainly, both consequences are not good for a child's relationship
with a parent or the community. As serious harm to the child has not been
proven by medical studies, but a significant negative impact on
relationships with parents seems apparent, a ban on the procedure would
not be supported by a relational perspective. Female ritual circumcision, on
the other hand, may warrant different treatment because the effect on the
relationship, which may be just as negative given cultural beliefs in the
practice, would need to be weighed against the more undisputed and
demonstrable negative effects on female children.354 Such clear negative
health effects warrant state interference regardless of harm to relationships.
2. Mature Children's Civil Rights
Mature children's civil rights are more complex because they involve
not only ongoing care relationships, but also the will of children.
Children's frustration in having their will impeded further complicates
relationships. Therefore, more mature children's own desires must be part
of any relational framework. Issues of both autonomy and dependency are
directly at play in these considerations.
The right to marriage is considered fundamental.35 5 However, even
mature children have limited rights in this regard. 5 6 Fear of immature
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/khitan-SIM_4296 [https://per
ma.cc/H36D-6GCX] (discussing the various Islamic opinions on circumcision, called "Khitan" under
Islamic law).
. See, e.g., Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, To Mutilate in the Name of Jehovah or Allah:
Legitimization of Male and Female Circumcision, 13 MED. & L. 575, 608 (1994) ("Male circumcision
is practiced by the adherents of the three monotheistic religions . .. [which include] Christianity.").
" See, e.g., Toure v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 44, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that "FGM may
constitute persecution under some circumstances"); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 789 n.2
(9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the substantial harms of FGM); In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 WL
379826, at *4-5 (B.I.A. June 13, 1996) (citing physical harm of female genital mutilation); WORLD
HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN INTERAGENCY STATEMENT 34-35
(2008) (outlining several complications other than effects of the original cut that result from FGM,
including the need for later surgery, urinary and menstrual problems, painful sexual intercourse, and
infertility).
3 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (reaffirming the well-established
principle that the right to marriage is fundamental).
3 On one hand, it is true that a child, because of his minority age, is not beyond the protection of
the Constitution. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) ("The constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults"). On the other hand,
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decision-making and arranged coercive marriages keeps many children's
rights advocates in favor of strict guidelines preventing marriage until the
age of majority.35 7 Indeed, the right to marry is restricted in most states to
those who have reached the age of eighteen.358 In many states, however,
parental consent will allow a teenager to marry younger. 35 9 Notably, in a
few states such as Maryland and North Carolina, exceptions are made if
the minor is expecting or has given birth to a child.360
In the seminal case of Moe v. Dinkins, 361 a fifteen-year-old pregnant
girl, Maria, wanted to marry her boyfriend, Raoul, who was eighteen years
old.362 After Maria became pregnant, the couple moved into an apartment
together.363 Maria requested consent from her mother to marry Raoul, but
her mother refused because her mother feared that she would lose the
welfare benefits she was receiving for Maria.364 Another couple, Christina
and Pedro, also plaintiffs in the case, lived together in Pedro's father and
step-mother's home.3 65 Just as Maria's mother had refused to consent to
their marriage, so too did Christina's mother when Christina became
pregnant; she instead arranged for Christina to have an abortion.366 The
couples wanted to marry "to express their commitment to and caring for
the Court has recognized the state's power to make adjustments in limiting the constitutional rights of
minors. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968) (holding that a criminal statute,
which accorded minors under seventeen a more restricted right than that assured to similarly situated
adults, did not infringe upon their freedom of expression); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-
71 (1944) (upholding child labor law prohibiting minors from selling merchandise on public streets,
despite Jehovah Witness's challenge based on constitutional right to religious freedom).
" See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 87, at 1862-63 (arguing that states should impose age
restrictions on marriage).
" See id at 1832 (recognizing that "[t]he presumptive age of marital consent is ... eighteen in
all states but two, [Nebraska and Mississippi]").
359 See id. ("Every state permits adolescents younger than eighteen to marry with either parental
or judicial consent, with most setting the minimum marital age at sixteen."). For example, Alaska
allows minors between the ages of fourteen and eighteen to receive a marriage license upon court order,
absent parental consent, but only if the parents are "(A) arbitrarily and capriciously withholding
consent; (B) absent or otherwise unaccountable; (C) in disagreement among themselves on the
question; or (D) unfit to decide the matter." ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.05.171(bX2)(A)-(D) (West
2015). Similarly, Delaware permits minors to marry with court order absent parental consent, even
though parental consent is a factor in a court's determination. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123(b) (West
2016). In Georgia, a minor who is at least sixteen years old may marry upon obtaining parental consent.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-3-2, 19-3-37(b) (West 2015). Finally, Hawaii requires both parental consent and
court order if a minor, under the age of eighteen, wishes to be married. RAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1(2),
572-2 (West 2015).
36 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(aX2), (b)(2) (West 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-
2.1(a) (West 2015).
361 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982).
36 2 Id. at 625.
363 id.
36Id at 626.
35Id
36 Id
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each other, to legitimate their relationship, and to raise their child in accord
with their beliefs in a traditional family setting sanctioned by law." 3 67 In
justifying the parental consent restriction (on children's constitutional
rights), the court emphasized children's impaired capacity for decision-
making, parental rights to make decisions for children, and children's
vulnerability: "the law presumes that the parents 'possess what the child
lacks in maturity' and that 'the natural bonds of affection lead parents to
act in the best interest of their children."' 36 8 In addition, the court described
the denial of the right to marriage as merely temporary, and therefore held
that marriage could legally be denied to children.36 9
The case was decided from a parental rights perspective, in
conjunction with a limited view of children's constitutional rights.
Children's rights advocates have argued that such measures deny children
their constitutional rights because the state should be able to step in, weigh
the circumstances, and make a determination in a child's best interests, or
out of respect for children's autonomy. From a relational perspective, it is
hard to see how preventing these couples from marrying, due to a lack of
parental consent, supports ongoing care relationships. The parents who are
withholding consent are not providing significant care to their children
who are living independently. On the contrary, the refusal to give consent
is preventing the solidification of the care relationships for their
grandchildren. Thus, allowing state interference will not cause significant
harm to the ongoing relationship, whereas not interfering may cause such
harm. Therefore, from the relational perspective, state intervention to
override parents' discretion and allow these marriages should be permitted
in order to effectuate children's civil rights. Furthermore, although the
inability to marry is temporary, it poses more harm to the child than to the
ongoing relationship. In other cases, where there is an ongoing care
relationship and children who wish to marry are still dependent, deferring
to parental decisions makes more sense. In other words, underage marriage
can be restricted by the state with parents allowed to give consent, but the
state should be able to step in to override parental fiat in circumstances
where the children are more independent, especially where there is no
threat that such intervention will cause harm and where lack of
intervention could cause significant harm. In some jurisdictions, the state
can step in and allow marriage under the age of majority by judicial
approval absent parental consent.3 70 This may have mitigated the problems
367 Id
' Id. at 629 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
369 Id at 630.
o70 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-106(1)(aXI) (West 2015) (allowing judicially
approved marriages, even absent parental consent, for children over the age of sixteen but less than
eighteen); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/208(a)-(b) (West 2016) (allowing state to override parental
consent for children who are sixteen or seventeen).
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faced by the mature children in Moe.
In some circumstances, the effect of the harm to the individual child by
the state not interfering is greater than the harm of interference to the
relationship. When the threat and danger to the child-emotional or
physical-is not temporary, but rather is grave and life-changing, as when
parents refuse to allow a child to have a wanted abortion when parental
consent is needed, the significant harm to the child is likely to outweigh
any harm to the relationship even if it is ongoing. Therefore, as in
marriage, the state should be able to override parental consent laws, or,
preferably, a teenager should be allowed to abort without consent. This
position is in alignment with the Supreme Court's position in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.31
V. CONCLUSION
Although best interests is the current standard mechanism used to
protect children, it is more a goal than a practical legal standard. It can be
manipulated to reflect differing perspectives on how best to protect
children-a state-centered, parent-centered, or child's-own-voice-centered
perspective. As applied, it is a standard that relies on individualistic rights
and interests, which does not sufficiently consider or emphasize the
ongoing relationships upon which children are most dependent, and which
most contribute to children's welfare. Instead, I argue for a relational
perspective on children's rights in order to provide more guidance and
clearer support for relationships in a manner that will more concretely and
effectively protect children. The principles I have derived from the theory
of relational rights, which I have described in detail above, can help
judges, mediators, and advocates make choices that truly advance the
interests of children. Of course, it is not possible to cover all applications
of these principles, but I have tried to set out guidelines that are practical
and approachable to frame a relational approach to children's rights. It is
important that all three guidelines be used in conjunction with each other,
as each adds to the overall change I advance. Moreover, the principles
themselves may not be exclusive, as other legal principles can support
relational rights of children. However, I find these three principles to be
broad and particularly helpful in setting the stage for relational rights for
children.
Children neither need the right to be fully left alone, nor the benefit of
state interference as against caring, supportive family members. Further, it
is the fear of giving children liberty rights vis-A-vis parents that makes
embracing children's rights so difficult. However, children need protection.
371 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1975) (holding that a blanket parental consent requirement for abortions by
unmarried minors was an unconstitutional violation of minors' Due Process rights).
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Children's rights should come in the form of support for care relationships
that serve them, not in support for them as individuals in separation from
parental care. As they mature, however, their individualism can be
increasingly expressed and interference over parental objects more easily
justified. Such support for relational rights can create a seismic shift in
policy initiatives, family law, and beyond that seeks to support
relationships for the sake of children, and in the name of children's rights.
